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Abstract 
 
This paper examines cross-country and cross-industry differences in labor productivity performance 
and their association with ICT. It broadens earlier work with coverage of 52 industries in 16 OECD 
countries. The analysis suggests that ICT diffusion in Europe is following similar industry patterns to 
those observed in the U.S., but at a considerably slower pace. The key differences between Europe 
and the U.S. are in the intensive ICT-using services, with U.S. productivity growth showing a strong 
acceleration during the second half of the decade, whereas growth stalled in the EU. More 
specifically, the U.S. showed rapid productivity expansion in retail and wholesale trade and securities, 
which account for much of the overall U.S.-EU gap in productivity growth since 1995. In the ICT-
producing sector, computers and communication equipment showed strong productivity growth and 
acceleration in virtually all countries, but differences are much bigger across countries for ICT-
producing services, such as telecom services.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
A wide variety of recent studies - at firm, industry and macro levels of detail - have assessed the 
impacts of information and communication technologies (ICT) on productivity growth during the 
1990s.  In addition, there have been many case studies of the way that ICT influences performance. 
For the United States, there is widespread agreement that production of ICT goods has strongly 
contributed to acceleration in productivity growth during the 1990s.
1 Although there are a few 
dissenters, a consensus is emerging on the proposition that the diffusion of ICT is also a prime 
contributor to productivity growth elsewhere in the economy. In particular, service sectors are among 
the main beneficiaries of increased investment in ICT, leading to faster growth in labor productivity 
and in many cases even in more total factor productivity growth.
2  
 
In the case of Europe, there is some evidence that ICT investment has contributed to faster output 
growth, although in most cases to a lesser extent than in the United States.
3 However, it has also been 
widely noted that European countries generally have not exploited the productivity enhancing 
potentials to the extent of the United States.
4  In fact, productivity growth in Europe has declined 
since the mid-1990s, but relatively little is known about how widespread this productivity slowdown 
was across industries. In our earlier work we found that in most European countries – and in contrast 
to the United States – the accelerated growth of labor productivity in ICT-producing industries and 
intensive ICT-using industries was offset by a substantial slowdown in labor productivity growth in 
less-intensive ICT-users.
5 However, this evidence hides substantial variation within these major 
groups of industries.  
 
This paper examines international differences in the labor productivity performance across ICT 
producing industries, intensive ICT-using industries and less intensive users (hereafter, for the sake of 
simplicity, called “non ICT” industries), with an additional breakdown to manufacturing and service 
industries.  It represents an intermediate step in our efforts to develop full-scale measures of ICT 
capital and other capital suitable for comprehensive analysis at the industry level. Using evidence on 
ICT intensity by industry in the U.S. and – on a much more limited scale – outside the U.S., we 
examine cross-country and cross-industry  differences in labor productivity performance and their 
association with ICT. 
This paper broadens our earlier work in two ways. First, it extends considerably the country and 
industry coverage by updating and extending the database to include output and employment 
information for 52 individual industries (ISIC rev 3), of which 20 are in services, for 16 OECD 
countries. The countries are thirteen European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jorgenson (2001). 
2 See, for example, Baily and Lawrence (2001), Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002) and Triplett and Bosworth 
(2002). Among the main dissenters are Gordon (2000, 2002) and McKinsey Global Institute (2001).  
3 See, for example, Daveri (2001, 2002), ECB (2001) and Colecchia and Schreyer (2001). 
4 See, for example, OECD (2000, 2001). 
5 See, van Ark (2001) and McGuckin and van Ark (2001). A limited number of country specific studies in 
Europe have recognized the smaller contribution of ICT to productivity growth in ICT-using industries, mainly 
in services, including Oulton (2001) for the UK, Jalava and Pohjola (2001) and Niiniinen (2001) for Finland, 
van der Wiel (2001) for the Netherlands, Cette, Mairesse and Kocuglu (2001) for France, and De Arcangelis, 
Jona-Lasinio and Manzocchi (2001) for Italy.   2
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), 
Canada, Japan and the United States for the period from 1990 to 2000. The database provides the raw 
material to examine productivity impacts of ICT both within and across countries.  
 
Second, the present analysis moves beyond the standard comparisons of differences in growth 
rates across groups of industries that we used previously by applying some simple regression models. 
This extension is possible since, unlike our earlier work we do not exclusively deal with the 
performance of ICT-producing, ICT-using and the non-ICT industries as a whole. With information 
on each industry, it is possible to assess the importance and significance of the widely different trends 
among individual industries. Whether and by how much these trends differ by country is a key issue 
we consider here. In particular, among service industries we find a very wide variation in productivity 
performance. 
 
As in our earlier work, we mainly rely on U.S. information on capital by industry to group 
industries into ICT-producing, ICT-using and specific “non-ICT” industries. We interpret this U.S. 
industry grouping as a reflection of the opportunities for applying ICT in other countries. In the face 
of relatively meager direct data for Europe on ICT intensity, it helps us to identify where an ICT-
productivity relationship is likely to emerge in Europe. We also look at capital and investment 
intensity measures for some major European countries to investigate whether this assumption is likely 
to be violated. While the information on ICT capital by industry outside the U.S. is not suitable for 
direct econometric work, it offers evidence on differences in the timing and industry pattern of 
diffusion of ICT in Europe. 
 
Table 1 summarizes our results in terms of labor productivity growth rates and GDP shares for 
major industry groups for the European Union and the United States. The first impression from the 
table is a widespread acceleration in U.S. productivity growth in particular for ICT-producing 
manufacturing and ICT-using services. Secondly, in contrast to the U.S., overall productivity growth 
in the European Union slowed, except for the ICT-producing sector of the economy where it 
accelerated. In the ICT-using sector in Europe productivity growth did not improve, whereas growth 
rates declined in non-ICT industries.  
   3
Table 1: Productivity growth and GDP shares of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-ICT industries in the EU 
and the U.S.
EU
b US EUb US EUb US
Total Economy 1.9 1.1 1.4 2.5 100.0 100.0
ICT Producing Industries 6.7 8.1 8.7 10.1 5.9 7.3
ICT Producing Manufacturing 11.1 15.1 13.8 23.7 1.6 2.6
ICT Producing Services 4.4 3.1 6.5 1.8 4.3 4.7
ICT Using Industries
a 1.7 1.5 1.6 4.7 27.0 30.6
ICT Using Manufacturing 3.1 -0.3 2.1 1.2 5.9 4.3
ICT Using Services 1.1 1.9 1.4 5.4 21.1 26.3
Non-ICT Industries 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.5 67.1 62.1
Non-ICT Manufacturing 3.8 3.0 1.5 1.4 11.9 9.3
Non-ICT Services 0.6 -0.4 0.2 0.4 44.7 43.0
Non-ICT Other 2.7 0.7 1.9 0.6 10.5 9.8
a) excluding ICT producing
b) EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, which represents over 90% of EU GDP.
Notes: Productivity is defined as value added per person employed
Source: Tables 5 and 6
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000
Productivity growth GDP share
 
 
The latter suggests that differences with the U.S. go beyond differences in the diffusion of new 
technologies. There are surely many factors involved, among them overall performance of product 
and labor markets, differences in initial capital -labor ratios and the widespread moderation of initially 
high wages in Europe since the mid 1990s. Nonetheless, technology diffusion is a big part of the 
story. There is diffusion of ICT in Europe, but at  a slower pace than in the United States in 
particularly during the second half of the 1990s. 
 
Looking beyond the aggregate numbers there are 3 factors that stand out. First, European 
countries show rapid increases in labor productivity growth in ICT- producing manufacturing and 
service industries alike. The contribution of these industries to aggregate productivity growth was 
slightly lower than in the U.S. due to the smaller size of these industries. 
 
Second, since 1995 most European countries have shown a  significant difference between 
productivity growth in ICT-using services and non-ICT services although this difference in 
performance is much larger for the U.S. than for Europe. Of particular importance, the U.S-EU 
differential in productivity growth is largely associated with much faster productivity growth in three 
ICT-using service industries, namely in retail and wholesale trade and in securities. Because of their 
large share in output and employment, these service industries feature prominently in accounting for 
the aggregate productivity growth differential. Moreover, compared to the U.S., each of these 
industries can be linked to restricted opportunities for expansion and implementation of ICT in 
Europe. 
 
Third, it appears that ICT diffusion in Europe is following patterns across industries that are 
similar to those experienced in the U.S. Not only is there a reasonable correlation between the 
industry distributions of productivity growth in the U.S. during the earlier half of the 1990s and the 
European industry productivity pattern from 1995-2000, but the industry distributions of ICT capital 
across countries are similar as well.    4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss different measures of ICT intensity by 
industry, which we use  to group our industries into ICT-using and non-ICT industries. Next we 
examine the distributions of labor productivity between these industry groups and whether and how 
much they differ across countries using econometric analysis (Section 3). Within these groups we also 
focus on differences in growth performance of service industries, which are among the most intensive 
users of ICT. In Section 4 we look at the dynamics of productivity growth for individual industries – 
and in particular services industries – classified as ICT-using or non-using. Section 5 concludes with 
some suggestions for further research. 
 
2.  Measures of ICT Use and Industry Grouping by ICT-Categories 
 
While the levels of detail, breadth of coverage and particulars of the measurement methodology of the 
impact of ICT on productivity vary across studies, they can be grouped into two main types: growth 
accounting exercises that decompose the growth into various components or sources, and econometric 
models that seek to “explain” variations in performance by variations in the use of ICT technology.
6 
In this paper we make use of both approaches to examine the relationship between ICT use and labor 
productivity growth, but our focus is on a somewhat indirect measure of the impact of ICT on growth, 
i.e, labour productivity growth by industry related to the intensity of ICT use.  
 
To distinguish between industries that use ICT more or less intensively, we must choose as a 
practical matter between three possible measures of ICT use by industry. These are the share of ICT 
investment in total investment, the share of ICT capital in total capital, and the share of the flow of 
capital services from ICT in total capital services.  The latter measure has our preference, as the 
service flow per unit of ICT capital can be quite different from the flow from a unit of non-ICT 
capital. Service flows are calculated by estimating a user cost of each type of capital, and these can be 
relatively high for ICT capital because of high rates of depreciation. Thus a simple measure of ICT’s 
share of total assets may understate the flow of services from it.
7 Unfortunately, except for aggregate 
studies and industry level analyses for the U.S, the data requirements limit the possibilities for the use 
of capital services as a measure of ICT use.
8 For example, industry level data on the ICT capital stock 
are only available for five countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, and U.S.) and are not fully 
consistent across countries. Outside the U.S. there is an almost complete lack of data on ICT capital 
services by industry. 
 
Faced with these data limitations, we largely base our grouping on the U.S. estimates of capital 
services by industry for 1995 by Stiroh (2001). The rationale behind our choice of this indicator (in 
                                                 
6 We would also include in the econometric category the numerous case studies that explore how ICT operates 
in particular plants, firms or industries. 
7 In addition user cost measures by industry will also take account of possible high returns on ICT capital in 
particular industries. For example, in the oil extraction industry a small investment in ICT has fundamentally 
changed the methods by which this industry explores new oil reserves (Olewiler, 2002). But when using the 
capital services approach, capital returns can be high even with small amounts of investment in ICT. 
8 Capital services estimates by industry are an integral part of both the growth accounting analyses by Jorgenson 
and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000) for the U.S., Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) for OECD 
countries, and van Ark et al. (2002) for the European Union. Stiroh (2001) and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002) 
also use this measure at the industry level. For a limited number of country-specific studies, see footnote 5.     5
addition to our preference for capital services measures as discussed above) is the assumption that the 
U.S. distribution of ICT intensity across industries defines the opportunity set for productive use of 
ICT. Then we use this distribution to study to what extent other countries have used the opportunities 
ICT provides in these industries. The use of the U.S. distribution of ICT provides an independent 
standard that helps us identify where to expect differential productivity performance in Europe. For 
example, the U.S. has shown acceleration of productivity growth in industries like finance, banking 
and business services that are heavy users of ICT.  In addition, case studies of ICT use in industries as 
diverse as retail trade and trucking support the contention that ICT makes an important contribution to 
enhanced productivity growth.  
 
A distinction between heavy users of ICT and less intensive ICT-users (non-ICT) is necessarily 
arbitrary as there are few if any industries that do not use ICT at all, so it requires an arbitrary cut-off 
point. For example, Stiroh’s cutoff point is the median of the 57 industries he studied. In other studies 
gaps in the proportion of industry capital devoted to IT were used to separate using and non-using 
industries. However, the limitations of this type of grouping of industries should not be overdrawn. It 
certainly can have advantages when ICT intensity measures contain substantial noise.
9  Moreover this 
type of industry grouping has worked well in several earlier U.S studies to identify the industries with 
the highest impact from increased ICT use (McGuckin and Stiroh, 2001, 2002; Stiroh, 2001).  
 
ICT-Producing, ICT-Using and Non-ICT Industry Groups 
Table 2 provides the basic grouping of industries. One important issue is that our industry data largely 
use the OECD STAN database on national accounts (though with some refinements), which is based 
on the international ISIC Rev. 3 classification. In contrast, Stiroh’s (2001) study, from which we 
obtained the U.S. capital services measures,  uses the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. 
They are based on (largely) the 2-digit SIC87 (Standard Industrial Classification).
10 On the one hand, 
this reduces the industry detail for the U.S. somewhat since our database distinguishes 52 industries 
instead of a maximum for the U.S. of 57 industries.
11 For example, for transport and storage (ISIC rev 
60-63) Stiroh distinguishes seven separate industries, of which only two (air transportation and 
transportation services) are above his median cut-off point of industries with the highest ICT capital 




Table 2 – Grouping of ICT producing, ICT using, and less intensive ICT-using Industries 
   
ISIC Rev. 3  ICT-producing industries 
                                                 
9 The BEA notes with the capital and investment data by type and industry suggest that these data are much less 
reliable than more aggregated figures. 
10 See Appendix Tables A.1 for a detailed comparison of industries included in ICT-using according to our study 
and Stiroh’s study. Within the ICT-producing, ICT-using groups and non-ICT groups we distinguish further 
between manufacturing industries and service industries. Section 3 and Appendix B describe our data sources in 
more detail. 
11 For none of the countries, data was available on extra-territorial organizations (ISIC 99), so we do not report 
on this industry.   6
   
  ICT-producing manufacturing 
30  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
313  Insulated wire and cable 
321  Semiconductors and other electronic components 
322  Communication and broadcasting equipment 
323  Radio and TV receivers 
331  Medical and measuring equipment and industrial process control 
  ICT-producing services 
64  Post and telecommunications 
72  Computer and related services 
   
ISIC Rev. 3  ICT-using industries 
   
  ICT-using manufacturing 
18  Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 
22  Printing and publishing 
29  Machinery and equipment 
31, excl. 313  Electrical machinery and apparatus, excluding insulated wire 
33, excl. 331  Precision and optical instruments, excluding ICT instruments 
351  Building and repairing of ships and boats  
353  Aircraft and spacecraft 
352+359  Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
36-37  Miscellaneous manufacturing and recycling 
  ICT-using services 
51  Wholesale trade 
52  Retail trade 
65  Financial intermediation 
66  Insurance and pension funding 
67  Activities related to financial intermediation 
71  Renting of machinery and equipment 
73  Research and development 
741-743  Professional business services 
   
ISIC Rev. 3  Less-intensive ICT-using industries 
   
  Other Manufacturing 
15-16  Food products, beverages and tobacco 
17  Textiles 
19  Leather, leather products and footwear 
20  Wood and products of wood and cork 
21  Pulp, paper and paper products 
23  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
24  Chemicals and chemical products 
25  Rubber and plastic products 
26  Non-metallic mineral products 
27  Basic metals 
28  Fabricated metal products 
34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers   7
 
Table 2 (continued) 
   
  Other Services 
50  Repairs  
55  Hotels and restaurants 
60-63  Transport and storage 
70  Real estate activities 
745-749  Other business services (non-professional) 
75  Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
80  Education 
85  Health and social work 
90-93  Other community, social and personal services 
95  Private households with employed persons 
99  Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
   
  Other Industries 
01-05  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
10-14  Mining and quarrying 
40-41  Electricity, gas and water supply 
45  Construction 
 
On the other hand, in some cases we use a more refined classification than Stiroh did on the basis 
of the U.S. SIC. This is especially true in the area of ICT producing industries (such as computers and 
other ICT equipment) and for business services. The group of ICT-producing industries (which for the 
sake of analysis are distinguished from the group of intensive ICT using industries) is derived from a 
classification by the OECD (2002), that includes industries producing ICT-hardware, software and 
ICT services.
12 We therefore broke out office and computer equipment (U.S. SIC 357) from industrial 
machinery and equipment (U.S. SIC 35), and radio and TV equipment (U.S. SIC 365-367) from 
electronic and electric equipment (U.S. SIC 36). We also distinguish computer services and 
telecommunication services as ICT-producing service industries. In ICT-using services, we 
distinguish between business services that are clearly part of ICT using industries (i.e., professional 
business services, including accountants, architects and technical engineering) and those that are 
clearly not (such as security and cleaning services).  
 
                                                 
12 In fact, the OECD classification also includes wholesale and renting of office and computing machinery, 
which we were not able to back out from the data. Moreover, telecommunication services in our data still 
include postal services.     8
We most strongly departed from Stiroh’s grouping of industries, i.e., by excluding education, 
health and social work from the ICT-using group. Even though these industries are above the median 
of industries with the highest share of ICT capital services, they use relatively little capital anyway as 
value added largely consists of labor income. Indeed we find that when looking at ICT capital as a 
percentage of output in education, health and social work, these industries are at the lower end of the 
distribution of ICT intensive industries. Our preference to exclude these industries from ICT-intensive 




Comparisons with Other Countries’ Measures of ICT Use 
One way to crosscheck the sensibility of the industry groupings in Table 2 is to see how they look 
from the perspective of the industry measures of ICT and IT intensities that we have for some other 
countries. Appendix Table A.2 provides the average proportion of total IT investment (i.e., excluding 
investment in communication equipment) in total investment for France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the U.K. and the U.S over the 1993-97 period. We also obtained information on the share of ICT 
capital in the total capital stock for France and the UK from a recent study by O’Mahony and de Boer 
(2002), and compared it to information on the U.S. ICT capital share obtained from the BEA. While 
the data are spotty, they show wide variation across industries in ICT or IT intensities across 
countries. Some industries spend a minor percentage of their investment budget on ICT and IT (for 
example, around respectively 2.5% and 1% in agriculture) while in other industries, like finance, 
about 50% of investment is in ICT and about 20% in IT.  This wide variation is also observed in the 
U.S. data. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the rank correlation for each country pair for IT investment and ICT capital 
intensities respectively.
14 All rank correlations for IT intensity in Table 3 are positive and most are 
above 0.50.
15 France is the only country where the correlations with other countries appear low. The 
correlations on ICT capital intensity in Table 4 are somewhat higher for France and somewhat lower 
for the UK, but still clearly positive.  
 
                                                 
13 Our present industry grouping deviates somewhat from what we used in our earlier work, which was based on 
more limited evidence on ICT investment/output ratios and ICT capital shares for the U.S. and the Netherlands 
(van Ark, 2001; McGuckin and van Ark, 2001). First, chemicals were reclassified as a non-ICT industry, based 
on the fact that it was clearly in the lower half of the distribution. The second change was to add retail trade to 
the intensive user categories. Retail trade is one of the more intensive ICT users based on the capital service 
measure, but not when based on the share of the ICT stock. We also reclassified three transport equipment 
industries (ships, aircraft and other) to ICT-using as well as furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing, since 
these four industries are above the median ICT intensity according to Stiroh’s (2001) measure. The last change 
we made was to include industrial machinery with the ICT-using industries. It is not possible to make this 
decision solely based on the U.S. intensity measures since industrial machinery under the SIC classification also 
includes computers. However, in the other countries for which we have intensity measures, the machinery 
industry (without computers) also shows up as an intensive ICT user. 
14 By comparing the rankings of the industries, we minimize the effects of differences  – measurement 
methodology, data availability and definitions, etc. – that affect the intensity levels estimates across countries. 
15 Real estate is excluded as capital stock measures in this industry also include imputed housing, which distorts 
the picture.    9
Table 3: Rank correlations between IT investment intensity by industry,
mid 1990s
France Germany Netherlands UK U.S.
France 0.12 0.45 0.24 0.35




Note: investment intensity measured as investment in IT equipment
(excluding communication equipment) as share of total equipment
investment.  France, UK, U.S.: 1993-1997; Germany: 1991-1994;
Netherlands; 1990-1995
Sources: Appendix Table A.2





Note: capital intensity measured as ICT capital as share of total
capital equipment in 1995. France, UK, U.S.: 1995
Sources: France and UK: O’Mahony and de Boer (2002); U.S.:
BEA, Fixed Asset Tables, Section 4: Non-Residential Fixed Assets
(http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/faweb/AllFATables.asp#S4)
 
Overall, the rankings suggest that the intensive ICT using industries are similar across 
countries. This suggests that using the U.S. experience with ICT diffusion as a measure of the 
opportunity set is reasonable. This conclusion is also supported by results from O’Mahony and de 
Boer (2002) that show that ICT capital shares in French and British service industries are –just as in 
the U.S.– higher than in manufacturing. Industries like transport and communication and financial and 
business services are all in the upper part of the intensity distribution –a finding which also emerges 
from a similar study on the Netherlands (CPB, 2001).
16 O’Mahony and de Boer also show that the 
amount of ICT capital per hour worked in the U.S. is considerably higher than in France and the UK 
across almost all industries. The latter suggests a slower pace of ICT diffusion in European countries, 
which is confirmed by evidence on ICT capital intensity at the aggregate level from studies such as 
Daveri (2001), Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), and van Ark et al. (2002). 
 
                                                 
16 However, the study by O’Mahony and de Boer also suggests lower capital intensities than in manufacturing 
for the distribution sector.    10 
3.  Does ICT make a Difference for Productivity? 
 
In the remainder of this paper we use the grouping of  industries according to ICT use to examine 
differences in labor productivity growth. In this section we investigate differences in productivity 
growth between the groups as a whole. In the next section we undertake a more detailed examination 
of individual industries within the ICT-using and non-ICT categories. One key issue is whether there 
is some commonality in productivity growth rates across countries within the industry groupings. We 
begin with a brief overview of our productivity data and related measurement issues.  
 
Data and Adjustments for Deflation of ICT goods
17  
The data for this study are for 16 OECD countries from 1990 to 2000. The database is largely draws 
on the new STAN database for national accounts from the OECD.
18 STAN includes industry series of 
GDP in current basic prices, and constant price series expressed as index numbers. Employment refers 
to all persons employed, including self-employed persons. As hours per employee at industry level 




For some ICT-producing industries, like insulated wire (ISIC 313) and instruments (ISIC 
331), the STAN database does not report the detail separating them from the broader industry to 
which they belong. For the U.S. we also had to break out office and computer equipment (ISIC 30) 
and radio, TV and communication equipment (ISIC 321-323) from the aggregate series on industrial 
machinery and electrical machinery and equipment respectively.  In addition, we needed to break out 
repairs, retail and wholesale trade (ISIC 50-52) and distinguish between ICT-intensive business 
services (ISIC 741-743) and non-ICT business services (ISIC 749). Although the procedures differed 
from country-to-country, in most cases output and employment shares for the more detailed industries 
were obtained from the OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services and the OECD Services 
Statistics on Value Added and Employment and applied to the more aggregated series from STAN.
20 
 
To obtain constant price series in national currencies we linked index series for real value 
added to 1995 GDP levels in current prices. These constant price series were distributed by industry 
within each of the industry groups distinguished  in Section 2 and then aggregated on the basis of 
                                                 
17 A detailed description of the data and adjustments is given in Appendix B.  
18 See http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-1-3245-0,00.html. 
Data for Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland are directly obtained from the countries’ national accounts. For 
France and Spain data presently only run up to 1999, and for Japan only up to 1998. German data start in 1991. 
At a later stage we aim to take these estimates further back to 1970 which is the starting date of the STAN 
database. 
19 Even though the decline in working hours in Europe means that labor productivity grew faster when 
measured in hours than when measured on a person employed-basis, differences across industries are not 
strongly affected by these different measures of labor productivity. 
20 In the case of the United States, we also heavily relied on detailed series from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis on value of shipments at the 4-digit level for manufacturing industries and gross output at the 3-digit 
level for non-manufacturing industries (http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn2/gpo.htm). In addition we used Input/Output 
tables from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/emp) to obtain shares of intermediate inputs in 
gross output which are needed for the double deflation (i.e., separate deflation of series on gross output and 
intermediate inputs) at value added level (see below and Appendix B).   11 
chain-weighted Törnqvist indexes. As a result our aggregated series do not exactly match the original 
GDP series for each country. 
 
Prior to these procedures, however, we faced a serious methodological problem concerning 
the deflation of output in ICT-producing industries – a problem already identified in earlier studies 
(e.g., Schreyer, 2000, 2002; Daveri, 2001). Since many countries develop price indices for ICT goods 
by matching prices of comparable models between two periods in time, the rapid changes in quality of 
ICT equipment are not adequately reflected in measured output. Only a limited number of countries, 
including the United States, Australia, Canada and France, use hedonic output price indexes in their 
national accounts that capture the quality changes. Therefore measured prices in these countries 
typically decline much more rapidly.  Some countries in Europe, for example Denmark and Sweden, 
do not create their own hedonic price indexes, but make use of the U.S. price index for ICT equipment 
with a correction for the U.S. dollar exchange rate. 
 
We adopted a procedure based on Schreyer (2000). The U.S. value added deflators for ICT-
producing manufacturing industries were applied to the other countries, after an adjustment for the 
ratio of the aggregate GDP deflator (excluding the deflators for ICT-producing manufacturing) for 
each country relative to the U.S. GDP deflator. As the series for ICT-producing manufacturing 
industries are not separately reported in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, the hedonic 
price indices for these industries were constructed with procedures and data similar to those used by 
BEA.
21 For most countries this procedure leads to considerably higher growth in ICT-producing 
manufacturing industries compared to the estimates reported in the national statistics (see Table 6 
below).  
 
A second issue of concern was the measure of real output in services. The current 
methodology of splitting the change in output value into a quantity component and a price component 
is difficult to apply to many service activities, as a quantity component can often not be distinguished. 
Moreover changes in the quality of services are also difficult to measure. These problems are not new, 
and improvement in measurement of service output has been a topic on the agenda of statisticians and 
academics for a long time.
22  
 
Despite these measurement problems, as long as the statistical bias remains relatively constant 
the traditional methods should suffice at least to measure the change in real output (Hulten, 2000). 
The increasing importance of ICT, however, likely led to understatement of the growth in real output 
by increasing quality changes in service output, although by how much is not known.
23 Various 
efforts to improve output measurement in services have been undertaken at statistical agencies across 
                                                 
21 We are grateful to Brian Moyer (BEA) and Robert Yuskavage (BEA) for advice. See also Kask and Sieber 
(2002) for similar procedures to obtain productivity growth rates for high-tech industries. However, our hedonic 
deflators refer to value added rather than gross output. 
22 See, for example, Griliches (1992) and the statistical work of the Voorburg Group on Service Statistics 
(http://www4.statcan.ca/english/voorburg/). For example, a key measurement issue is that information on inputs 
(such as labor income) is still used as a proxy for output in many service industries.    12 
the OECD. But much remains to be done. Unfortunately the actual steps taken to implement new 
methodologies in the national accounts are often not well documented, particularly outside the United 
States. Thus the evidence to claim that the national accounts in one country reflect better service 
output measurement than in another is not strong enough to draw any definitive conclusions on the 
lack of international comparability. We therefore take as our working assumption that the 
international comparisons between industries we observe reflect actual differences in productivity 
growth in the industry or grouping of industries examined. We briefly return to this issue in next 
section. 
 
In making comparisons between Europe and other countries, we calculated a European Union 
average based on eleven EU member states in our sample (covering more than 90 per cent of EU 
GDP). The 1995-based value added in each industry was converted to the euros using the exchange 
rate between each national currency and the value of the euro as fixed on January 1, 1999.
24 This 
procedure follows the actual practice of the OECD concerning data for years before 1999 (see OECD 
2001b). This method assumes, somewhat problematically, that there are no price differences between 
countries in the EU area – an assumption that incidentally is identical to what is assumed for U.S. 
states in the output statistics for the U.S. 
 
Productivity Growth by Industry Group 
Table 5 shows the relative importance of seven industry groups in the year 2000 for each 
country in our sample and for the European Union average. It shows the proportion of GDP accounted 
for by ICT-producing industries in manufacturing, ICT-producing industries in services, ICT-using 
industries in manufacturing (excluding the ICT-producing manufacturing industries), ICT-using 
industries in services (excluding the ICT-producing service industries), non-ICT industries in 
manufacturing, non-ICT industries in services and other non-ICT industries (including agriculture, 
mining, construction and public utilities).  
 
On average ICT-producing industries make up for at most 8 per cent of GDP, with Finland 
being a notable exception (just over 10 p er cent of GDP) because of its large communication 
equipment industry. Most countries in Europe have lower GDP shares in ICT-producing 
manufacturing and ICT-producing services than the United States. ICT-using industries (other than 
ICT-producing industries) also account for bigger shares in the United States than in Europe, but there 
is a clear difference between manufacturing and services. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
23  See Triplett and Bosworth (2001) and van Ark (2002) for a further discussion. McGuckin and Stiroh (2001) 
estimate for the U.S. that output understatement could be as high as 1.5 percentage points in individual 
industries, and productivity growth could be underestimated by up to 20%. 
24 For Sweden and the UK, which do not participate in the euro, we used their average exchange rate to the euro 
for 1999. For European countries for which we had missing years (e.g., 1990 for Germany and 2000 for France 
and Spain) we filled gaps by extrapolating with growth rates for the years for which we had data.    13 
Table 5: GDP shares of ICT producing, ICT using and non-ICT industries, 2000, current prices in %-points
Manufac- Services Manufac- Services Manufac- Services Other
turing turing turing
Austria 1.7 2.8 5.7 22.7 13.5 40.7 12.7
Denmark 1.1 3.6 5.9 20.6 10.1 47.7 11.0
Finland 5.9 4.7 6.1 15.3 13.9 43.1 11.1
Franceb 1.4 4.1 5.0 20.3 11.8 47.8 9.7
Germany 1.6 4.0 7.4 21.1 13.1 44.3 8.4
Ireland 7.0 5.3 6.2 25.2 18.9 24.8 12.5
Italy 1.0 3.7 6.8 22.8 12.8 42.8 10.3
Netherlands 1.4 4.4 4.7 24.1 10.3 42.7 12.5
Spainb 0.7 3.6 4.5 18.9 13.1 44.7 14.6
Sweden 2.1 5.7 5.6 18.1 12.2 48.2 8.1
UK 1.8 5.3 5.8 21.5 9.8 44.7 11.1
EU 1.6 4.3 5.9 21.1 11.9 44.7 10.5
Canadab 1.2 5.2 4.7 26.4 15.4 30.5 16.7
Japanc 2.9 3.3 7.0 20.4 11.2 41.3 13.8
Norway 0.6 2.9 3.6 17.2 6.0 36.4 33.2
Switzerland 2.2 4.0 7.2 30.0 12.5 34.9 9.3
US 2.6 4.7 4.3 26.3 9.3 43.0 9.8
a) excluding ICT producing; b) 1999; c) 1998; d) agriculture, mining, construction and public utilities
ICT Producing  ICT Usinga Non-ICT
 
 
In ICT-using manufacturing, almost every European country has higher GDP shares than the 
U.S., with Germany and S witzerland having notably larger shares.
25 This partly reflects the lower 
proportion of the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy, but also the comparative advantage of 
many European countries in ICT-using (and non-ICT) industries in manufacturing outside the ICT-
producing sector. In contrast, ICT-using services in the U.S. clearly account for a higher share of GDP 
in the U.S. than in Europe, with the exception of Switzerland where the banking sector dominates. In 
Section 4 we look in more detail at some of the main ICT-using service industries contributing to the 
American productivity growth advantage over Europe. 
                                                 
25 Here the exceptions are the Netherlands and Norway, where the non-ICT sector dominated because of large 
mineral extraction industries (natural gas and oil). In particular in Norway the oil extraction industry accounted 
for more than 10% of GDP.   14
Table 6: Labour productivity growth (value added per person employed) by industry group, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000
Austria Denmark Finland France
b Germanya Ireland Italy Nether- Spainb Sweden UK EU Canada
b Japanc Norway Switzer- US
lands land
1990-1995
Total Economy 2.3 1.6 3.3 1.0 2.1 3.0 1.8 0.7 1.6 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.1 0.8 3.3 -0.1 1.1
ICT Producing Industries 5.8 7.6 6.9 4.7 7.1 11.2 2.5 3.8 4.3 4.8 8.8 6.7 2.6 8.8 3.2 1.5 8.1
ICT Producing Manufacturing 7.6 6.5 8.9 10.0 6.8 17.1 4.6 5.7 8.3 -0.7 15.8 11.1 11.8 12.4 8.4 1.4 15.1
ICT Producing Services 4.8 7.9 4.8 2.6 5.9 2.2 1.6 2.3 3.1 6.8 5.6 4.4 0.4 4.2 2.1 1.5 3.1
ICT Using Industries
d 2.2 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.6 1.4 2.2 0.6 -0.2 3.4 2.3 1.7 1.8 0.7 4.3 -1.5 1.5
ICT Using Manufacturing 1.9 2.7 4.7 3.3 2.6 6.1 3.4 1.8 1.7 5.6 2.1 3.1 2.1 -1.1 1.3 0.0 -0.3
ICT Using Services 2.1 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.6 0.4 -0.7 2.5 2.5 1.1 1.9 1.4 5.2 -2.0 1.9
Non-ICT Industries 2.1 1.4 3.4 0.7 2.0 2.6 1.5 0.5 2.0 2.4 2.5 1.6 0.5 0.1 3.0 0.7 0.2
Non-ICT Manufacturing 4.6 2.9 6.2 3.4 4.4 7.8 2.7 3.7 3.5 6.3 4.0 3.8 2.1 0.4 2.2 4.4 3.0
Non-ICT Services 0.1 0.5 2.0 -0.3 0.9 -0.9 0.6 -0.2 0.9 1.5 1.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.4
Non-ICT Other 4.5 4.1 4.2 1.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 0.9 2.9 2.8 6.1 2.7 1.4 0.2 9.3 -0.2 0.7
Pro memoria: with national deflators
Total Economy 2.2 1.6 3.3 1.1 2.1 2.4 1.8 0.6 1.5 2.8 2.7 1.9 1.0 0.7 3.2 0.0 1.1
ICT Producing Manufacturing 3.8 6.7 12.4 9.5 4.3 4.0 3.5 4.3 0.5 -0.1 9.8 7.8 6.8 6.8 2.3 4.8 15.1
1995-2000
Total Economy 2.3 1.9 2.5 1.2 1.3 5.3 0.8 0.9 0.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.5
ICT Producing Industries 3.4 5.9 10.9 8.7 12.7 23.5 6.3 3.2 5.9 2.7 8.3 8.7 5.3 12.1 8.4 -1.9 10.1
ICT Producing Manufacturing 9.6 5.7 13.2 15.0 13.7 42.3 6.0 -1.9 13.1 1.1 16.1 13.8 16.9 19.5 4.9 -4.3 23.7
ICT Producing Services -0.4 5.9 8.1 6.2 11.9 -0.2 6.2 4.5 4.1 3.3 5.2 6.5 2.8 4.0 9.2 -0.7 1.8
ICT Using Industries
d
3.0 2.0 2.5 1.0 1.3 2.9 1.0 2.0 0.1 2.9 2.3 1.6 2.5 0.1 3.7 1.3 4.7
ICT Using Manufacturing 6.0 0.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 8.7 1.5 2.7 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.1 0.5 -1.3 3.3 1.2
ICT Using Services 2.1 2.5 3.0 0.7 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.9 -0.1 3.3 2.6 1.4 2.8 0.0 4.8 0.8 5.4
Non-ICT Industries 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.5 2.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.5
Non-ICT Manufacturing 4.6 3.8 3.0 2.7 0.5 10.4 0.6 2.0 -0.3 3.3 0.5 1.5 1.3 -0.3 1.7 4.4 1.4
Non-ICT Services -0.4 1.2 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -1.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 -0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.4
Non-ICT Other 4.0 1.2 2.3 1.1 2.3 1.2 2.5 0.0 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.9 1.1 -1.5 1.4 -1.3 0.6
Pro memoria: with national deflators
Total Economy 2.2 1.8 2.9 1.2 1.3 3.3 0.8 1.0 0.3 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.7 1.2 2.5
ICT Producing Manufacturing 4.6 3.9 19.9 13.9 6.8 8.6 1.4 3.3 1.6 21.1 5.5 10.1 6.6 9.3 3.2 0.7 23.7
a) 1991-1995; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98; d) excluding ICT producing industries  15 
Table 6 shows the productivity growth rates for the seven industry groupings distinguished 
above for individual countries and for the EU as a whole for the periods 1990-1995 and 1995-
2000. During the first half of the decade, aggregate productivity growth in Europe was 
considerably faster than in the United States, but since 1995 U.S. productivity growth was 1.1 
percentage points faster. But t here are some important differences in growth dynamics 
between industry groups. First, productivity growth in the ICT-producing industries in 
manufacturing (i.e., office and computer equipment and telecommunication equipment) is 
much faster than in the rest of the economy for virtually all countries. Hence once comparable 
price indexes reflecting the rapid technological change in ICT-producing manufacturing are 
adopted for all countries – and not just for the U.S. – ICT-producing industries exhibit rapid 
productivity growth in this (small) part of the economy nearly everywhere.
26  
 
The clearest and most systematic differences between Europe and the U.S., however, 
arise in services, particularly in ICT-producing and ICT-using services. In ICT-producing 
services productivity growth in many European countries is faster than in the United States.
27 
As we will see in Section 4 this is mainly due to the faster productivity growth in 
telecommunication services in Europe. In contrast, in ICT-using services (excluding the ICT-
producing services), U.S. performance was substantially better than in other countries since 
1995. For example, productivity in ICT-using services grew at 5.4% in the U.S. compared to 
1.4% for Europe in the 1995-2000 period. This difference is mainly due to better U.S. 
productivity performance in the securities and trade sectors. 
 
Industry Group Contributions to Aggregate Productivity Growth 
The impact of each industry group on labor productivity at the aggregate level depends not 
only on the average productivity growth rate of each industry, but also on the relative size of 
that industry.  Hence labor productivity for the total economy (P) can be perceived as the sum 
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In a time perspective the change in productivity between year t (Pt) and year t-1 (Pt-1) can be 
written as follows:  
                                                 
26 In Ireland productivity growth in ICT-producing manufacturing is faster than in the U.S. because of 
the large impact of the computer and semiconductor industries. The bottom line of Table 6 shows the 
estimates for all countries based on the original price index es for ICT-producing manufactuirng. This 
shows that the procedure adopted here makes substantial differences at the level of ICT-producing 
manufacturing. However, at the aggregate level the differences between the original and adjusted 
estimates are much smaller. 
27 We also find that productivity growth in ICT-using manufacturing is higher than in the U.S. for many 
countries.  
28 Based on Fabricant (1942).   16 
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where  i S and  i P are the average employment share and the average productivity level in 
year t and t-1 respectively. Thus aggregate productivity growth is decomposed into intra-
group productivity growth (the first term on the right-hand side, called “intra-effect”) and the 
effects of the reallocation of labor (the second term, called the “shift-effect”).
29  
 
Figure 1 shows the contributions by ICT-producing industries, ICT-using industries and 
the rest of the economy to labor productivity growth for 1990-1995 and 1995-2000.
30 The 
combined shift effect is shown separately (it is generally positive but small), so that the 
contributions of each individual group refer to the intra effects only. The chart shows that, 
despite their relatively small share in GDP, ICT-producing manufacturing industries 
contributed substantially to labor productivity growth, and for most countries this contribution 
increased during the second half of the 1990s. However, the contribution of ICT-producing 
manufacturing is substantially bigger in the U.S. than in Europe. For some European countries 
(in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Norway) the contribution of ICT-producing 
services even exceeded that of ICT-producing manufacturing. 
                                                 
29 See van Ark (2001), who also distinguished between a static and dynamic shift effect. However, the 
latter effect is the product of changes in shares and changes in labor productivity levels and is quite 
small when using annual data, as is the case here.
  
30 For the sake of clarity we put the three groups of industries in the non-ICT group together, so that 
there are only five industry groupings distinguished here.   17 
Figure 1: Contribution of industry groups to labor productivity growth
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Figure 1: Contribution of industry groups to labor productivity growth
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While the contribution of ICT-using manufacturing (excluding the producers) has 
generally been somewhat higher in Europe (and in particular in Germany) than in the U.S., 
ICT-using services (again excluding the producers) accounts for by far the largest 
contributions to productivity growth in the U.S.. In contrast, the productivity contribution of 
the non-ICT group has been smaller in the U.S. than in most other countries. Although the 
non-ICT contribution to labor productivity growth seriously diminished in almost all 
countries since 1995, its fall was much greater outside the U.S. As observed in our earlier 
work the deceleration of productivity contributions from the non-ICT sector has accounted for 
much of the aggregate slowdown that European countries experienced during the second half 
of the 1990s (van Ark, 2001; McGuckin and van Ark, 2001). 
 
Are the Differences in Productivity Growth between Industry Groups Significant? 
Even though this decomposition suggests substantive differences in growth rates across 
industry groupings, it is useful to determine the statistical strength of the differences between 
ICT-producing, ICT-using and other industries while taking account of variations in industry 
productivity growth associated with each group. For this purpose we carried out a number of 
country-specific regressions using a simple difference model for which we progressively 
increased the number of industry groupings. First we estimated the simplest model, which 
distinguishes only between ICT-using (including ICT-producing industries) and non-ICT 
industries: 
 
t i t i C P , , e g a + + = D   (3) 
 
where,  t i P, D  is the annual productivity growth rate, i denotes the industry group and t is years 
between 1990 and 2000. With 52 industries, this leads to a maximum of 520 observations per 
country. C is a dummy that is one if the industry is an ICT-intensive industry (which here 
means either an ICT-producing or an ICT-using industry). The estimated coefficients in Table 
7 have the following interpretation: a  is the average productivity growth rate for non-ICT 
industries and  g a +  is the mean growth rate of ICT intensive industries. Hence g shows the 
difference between the growth rate of ICT-using industries and non-ICT industries. We ran 
the regressions for two sub-periods, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000.
31 The left-hand side of Table 
7 focuses on the first half of the 1990s. It shows that in nearly all countries (except Austria 
and Spain) productivity growth was faster in ICT-using industries than in non-ICT industries. 
But during the early 1990s the difference between ICT-using and non-ICT industries was 
statistically significant for only four of the 16 countries (the U.S. at the one-percent level, 
Japan and Norway at the five-percent level and Canada at the ten-percent level). The right 
hand side of Table 7 shows that during the second half of the 1990s the difference in growth 
between ICT and non-ICT industries became significant for more than half of the countries, 
namely Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, the 
                                                 
31 All parameters are estimated with weighted least-squares (WLS), where the weight of each industry 
is its employment in the relevant year (this multiplies the dependent and the independent variable by 
the square root of employment).   20 
U.S. and the EU as a whole. It should be noted that the degree (or lack) of significance not 
only depends on the average growth difference between the two industry groups, but also on 
the variation within each group. 
 
Table 7: Impact of Non-ICT and ICT-using Industry Groupings on Productivity Growth 
Difference Difference
over non-ICT over non-ICT
Non-ICT ICT- ICT- Non-ICT ICT- ICT-
Using Using Using Using
Austria 2.238 1.878 -0.360 1.491 2.821 1.330
(1.074)** (0.442)*** (1.161) (0.700)** (0.546)*** (0.888)
Canadab 0.036 1.962 1.926 0.401 2.881 2.481
(0.420) (0.954)** (1.042)* (0.365) (0.402)*** (0.543)***
Denmark 1.264 2.209 0.945 1.710 2.051 0.341
(0.981) (0.844)*** (1.294) (1.002)* (0.850)** (1.314)
Finland 2.249 2.673 0.424 1.138 3.340 2.202
(0.641)*** (1.380)* (1.522) (0.386)*** (0.725)*** (0.821)***
Franceb 0.631 1.714 1.082 0.538 1.953 1.415
(0.442) (0.609)*** (0.753) (0.431) (0.646)*** (0.777)*
Germanya 1.629 1.946 0.317 0.144 1.743 1.599
(0.602)*** (0.686)*** (0.913) (0.329) (0.684)** (0.759)**
Ireland 0.799 1.690 0.891 0.358 4.842 4.485
(0.542) (1.303) (1.411) (1.042) (1.749)*** (2.036)**
Italy 1.528 1.985 0.457 0.506 1.221 0.714
(0.464)*** (0.583)*** (0.745) (0.311) (0.446)*** (0.544)
Japanc -0.600 1.218 1.819 -0.910 0.920 1.830
(0.523) (0.679)* (0.857)** (0.714) (1.257) (1.445)
Netherlands 0.585 0.921 0.336 0.640 1.741 1.101
(0.343)* (0.418)** (0.541) (0.356)* (0.510)*** (0.622)*
Norway 2.308 4.191 1.883 0.832 4.125 3.293
(0.495)*** (0.731)*** (0.883)** (0.371)** (0.759)*** (0.845)***
Spainb 1.523 1.044 -0.479 0.097 0.841 0.744
(0.341)*** (0.441)** (0.558) (0.235) (0.441)* (0.500)
Sweden 1.863 3.377 1.514 1.913 2.567 0.654
(0.347)*** (0.939)*** (1.001) (0.584)*** (0.498)*** (0.768)
Switzerland -1.287 -0.933 0.354 -0.093 0.100 0.194
(0.691)* (0.886) (1.124) (0.461) (0.570) (0.733)
UK 2.382 3.258 0.876 1.015 2.923 1.908
(0.536)*** (0.462)*** (0.708) (0.443)** (0.662)*** (0.797)**
EU 1.462 2.184 0.722 0.703 2.160 1.456
(0.286)*** (0.347)*** (0.450) (0.183)*** (0.351)*** (0.396)***
U.S. 0.041 2.361 2.320 0.529 5.105 4.576
(0.324) (0.527)*** (0.619)*** (0.242)** (0.622)*** (0.667)***
a) 1991-95; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98
Notes: The dependent variable is yearly productivity growth.
 Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are in brackets.
All estimations are done using weighted least squares, where employment is used as weights
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Using a slight modification of equation (3) we allow for differential effects between 
ICT-producing and ICT-using industries (excluding ICT-producing): 
 
t i t i U P P , 2 1 , e g g a + + + = D   (4) 
 
where the dummy variable P is one if the industry is an ICT-producing industry and U is one 
if it is an ICT-using industry. Table 8 shows that the ICT-producing industry group accounts 
for much of the difference in productivity growth rates relative to the non-ICT industry. 
Between 1990-1995, most countries (except France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden) showed significantly higher growth rates in ICT-producing compared to the non-ICT 
industries. On the other hand, only Norway and the United States showed significantly faster 
growth in other ICT-using (excluding ICT-producing) industries. For the second half of the 
1990s the difference between productivity growth in ICT-producing and non-ICT is still 
strong and significant at the 1%-significance level for most countries (including the EU as a 
whole). Moreover, the coefficient on the differences is higher than for the period 1990-1995 
in eight countries as well as for the EU as a whole. Still, apart from the United States, only 
Canada, Norway, the UK and the EU as a whole showed significantly higher growth for ICT-
using industries as well.
32  
                                                 
32 The significant result for the EU as a whole is caused by the fact that industries within the ICT-using 
group showed less volatility in productivity growth than individual EU member countries.   22
Table 8: Impact of Non-ICT, ICT-producing and ICT-using Industry Groupings on Productivity Growth 









Austria 2.238 5.098 1.467 2.860 -0.771 1.491 3.440 2.740 1.948 1.248
(1.076)** (1.018)*** (0.451)*** (1.481)* (1.167) (0.701)** (2.498) (0.523)*** (2.594) (0.875)
Canada
b
0.036 3.850 1.737 3.814 1.701 0.401 6.775 2.366 6.374 1.965
(0.421) (1.078)*** (1.059) (1.157)*** (1.140) (0.366) (1.840)*** (0.402)*** (1.876)*** (0.544)***
Denmark 1.264 7.013 1.485 5.748 0.221 1.710 6.136 1.451 4.427 -0.258
(0.983) (1.738)*** (0.930) (1.997)*** (1.353) (1.004)* (1.760)*** (0.918) (2.027)** (1.360)
Finland 2.249 5.870 2.079 3.620 -0.171 1.138 8.847 2.001 7.709 0.863
(0.642)*** (1.684)*** (1.602) (1.802)** (1.726) (0.387)*** (2.253)*** (0.564)*** (2.286)*** (0.684)
France
b
0.631 4.332 1.326 3.701 0.694 0.538 7.629 1.099 7.091 0.562
(0.443) (2.587)* (0.584)** (2.624) (0.734) (0.432) (2.273)*** (0.613)* (2.313)*** (0.750)
Germany
a
1.629 6.860 1.224 5.231 -0.405 0.144 11.712 0.459 11.569 0.315
(0.604)*** (1.963)*** (0.697)* (2.054)** (0.922) (0.329) (2.760)*** (0.548) (2.779)*** (0.640)
Ireland 0.799 8.945 0.528 8.147 -0.271 0.358 14.922 2.472 14.564 2.114
(0.543) (5.252)* (1.178) (5.280) (1.297) (1.044) (5.946)** (1.623) (6.037)** (1.930)
Italy 1.528 2.110 1.970 0.582 0.442 0.506 5.965 0.653 5.459 0.147
(0.465)*** (1.892) (0.614)*** (1.948) (0.770) (0.312) (1.686)*** (0.422) (1.714)*** (0.524)
Japan
c
-0.600 8.328 0.341 8.928 0.941 -0.910 12.257 -0.499 13.168 0.411
(0.525) (2.796)*** (0.647) (2.845)*** (0.833) (0.717) (6.254)* (1.019) (6.295)** (1.246)
Netherlands 0.585 3.636 0.571 3.051 -0.014 0.640 2.533 1.627 1.893 0.987
(0.344)* (1.326)*** (0.423) (1.370)** (0.545) (0.357)* (2.272) (0.483)*** (2.300) (0.600)
Norway 2.308 3.247 4.344 0.939 2.036 0.832 8.338 3.436 7.506 2.604
(0.496)*** (3.314) (0.651)*** (3.351) (0.819)** (0.371)** (2.385)*** (0.773)*** (2.414)*** (0.858)***
Spain
b
1.523 3.605 0.543 2.082 -0.980 0.097 2.015 0.582 1.918 0.485
(0.342)*** (1.226)*** (0.459) (1.272) (0.572)* (0.236) (1.908) (0.325)* (1.923) (0.402)
Sweden 1.863 3.343 3.383 1.480 1.520 1.913 2.549 2.572 0.636 0.658
(0.348)*** (2.731) (0.990)*** (2.753) (1.050) (0.585)*** (1.415)* (0.522)*** (1.531) (0.784)
Switzerland -1.287 1.726 -1.284 3.014 0.003 -0.093 -1.443 0.330 -1.350 0.423
(0.693)* (1.453) (0.988) (1.610)* (1.206) (0.462) (1.437) (0.627) (1.509) (0.779)
UK 2.382 7.778 2.610 5.396 0.228 1.015 6.019 2.410 5.004 1.395
(0.537)*** (1.493)*** (0.470)*** (1.587)*** (0.714) (0.444)** (1.920)*** (0.708)*** (1.971)** (0.836)*
EU 1.462 6.187 1.632 4.725 0.170 0.703 7.482 1.413 6.779 0.710
(0.287)*** (1.310)*** (0.317)*** (1.341)*** (0.427) (0.184)*** (1.836)*** (0.225)*** (1.845)*** (0.291)**
U.S. 0.041 6.382 1.784 6.341 1.743 0.529 6.655 4.858 6.126 4.329
(0.324) (1.976)*** (0.542)*** (2.002)*** (0.631)*** (0.242)** (2.538)*** (0.626)*** (2.549)** (0.671)***
a) 1991-95; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98; d) excluding ICT-producing
Notes: The dependent variable is yearly productivity growth. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are in brackets.
All estimations are done using weighted least squares, where employment is used as weights
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
Productivity Growth (1990-95) Difference over non-ICT Productivity Growth (1995-2000) Difference over non-ICT  23 
Table 9 provides estimates of a model that focuses on the distinction between 
manufacturing and services. The model in equation (4) was modified to: 
 
t i t i S R Q P , 2 4 3 1 , e g g g a + + + + = D   (5) 
 
where  a1 represents the average productivity growth rate  for non-ICT using services 
industries, dummy Q is one if the industry is an ICT-using industry in manufacturing, dummy 
R is one if the industry is ICT-using and in services, and dummy S is one when the industry a 
non-ICT and a non-services industry. So the differences in productivity growth estimated in 
equation (5) are all relative to the non-ICT using services group. The results provide further 
support for the hypothesis that ICT use, in particular in services, is driving productivity 
growth. Between 1990 and 1995, six countries showed significantly faster growth in ICT-
using services than in non-ICT using services and, between 1995 and 2000, that number went 
up to ten countries. For the EU average the difference between ICT-using and non-ICT 
services was already significant between 1990-1995 but became significant at the 1% level 
for the period 1995-2000. A comparison of the left and right hand sides of Table 9 shows that 
despite an increasing spread in productivity growth between ICT-using and non-ICT services 
from 1995-2000, productivity growth in ICT-using services was still somewhat slower 
compared to 1990-1995 for five European countries. For the U.S. there was a substantial 
increase in both the spread between ICT and non-ICT services and in the productivity growth 
of industries within the ICT-using services group itself.  24 
Table 9: Impact of Non-ICT Services, ICT-using Manufacturing, ICT-using Services and other non-ICT on Productivity Growth 
Non-ICT ICT-using ICT-using Other ICT-using ICT-using Other Non-ICT ICT-using ICT-using Other ICT-using ICT-using Other
Services Manufct. Services non-ICT Manufct. Services non-ICT Services Manufct. Services non-ICT Manufct. Services non-ICT
Austria -0.025 2.280 1.726 4.537 2.305 1.751 4.562 -0.361 6.209 1.725 3.676 6.570 2.086 4.036
(0.379) (0.707)*** (0.542)*** (1.987)** (0.802)*** (0.662)*** (2.023)** (0.818) (1.212)*** (0.591)*** (1.030)*** (1.463)*** (1.009)** (1.315)***
Canada
b
-0.327 3.850 1.693 0.731 4.176 2.019 1.057 -0.178 3.866 2.750 1.490 4.044 2.928 1.669
(0.542) (1.066)*** (1.081) (0.654) (1.196)*** (1.209)* (0.849) (0.390) (1.731)** (0.399)*** (0.671)** (1.775)** (0.558)*** (0.776)**
Denmark 0.515 2.855 1.971 2.982 2.340 1.456 2.467 1.604 0.551 2.561 1.972 -1.053 0.956 0.368
(1.323) (1.794) (0.957)** (1.150)** (2.229) (1.633) (1.753) (1.345) (1.661) (1.006)** (1.039)* (2.137) (1.680) (1.699)
Finland 0.980 4.201 1.981 4.311 3.222 1.001 3.331 0.326 3.482 3.271 2.619 3.156 2.945 2.293
(0.373)*** (2.195)* (1.755) (1.462)*** (2.227) (1.794) (1.509)** (0.282) (1.253)*** (0.892)*** (0.898)*** (1.284)** (0.935)*** (0.942)**
France
b
-0.230 3.872 1.060 2.284 4.102 1.290 2.514 0.111 3.652 1.489 1.495 3.541 1.378 1.383
(0.467) (1.247)*** (0.695) (0.905)** (1.331)*** (0.837) (1.019)** (0.461) (1.566)** (0.700)** (0.996) (1.632)** (0.838) (1.097)
Germany
a
0.363 3.499 1.232 3.547 3.136 0.869 3.183 -0.452 3.708 1.012 1.207 4.160 1.464 1.660
(0.594) (1.380)** (0.728)* (1.302)*** (1.502)** (0.940) (1.431)** (0.355) (1.294)*** (0.766) (0.644)* (1.342)*** (0.845)* (0.736)**
Ireland -1.029 6.459 -0.063 2.769 7.488 0.966 3.797 -0.373 14.056 1.692 1.295 14.429 2.065 1.668
(0.601)* (3.319)* (1.175) (0.712)*** (3.373)** (1.320) (0.932)*** (1.412) (4.688)*** (1.651) (1.550) (4.896)*** (2.172) (2.097)
Italy 0.547 3.707 1.229 2.932 3.161 0.682 2.385 -0.172 1.797 0.991 1.585 1.969 1.163 1.757
(0.508) (1.050)*** (0.657)* (0.795)*** (1.167)*** (0.831) (0.943)** (0.277) (0.794)** (0.531)* (0.622)** (0.841)** (0.599)* (0.681)**
Japan
c
-0.601 1.211 1.222 -0.599 1.812 1.823 0.002 0.007 4.377 -0.535 -1.986 4.370 -0.542 -1.993
(0.478) (1.606) (0.665)* (0.965) (1.676) (0.819)** (1.077) (0.907) (2.729) (1.229) (1.144)* (2.875) (1.528) (1.460)
Netherlands 0.070 2.508 0.507 1.782 2.438 0.438 1.712 0.356 1.250 1.847 1.395 0.894 1.491 1.039
(0.395) (0.965)** (0.447) (0.672)*** (1.043)** (0.596) (0.779)** (0.386) (1.640) (0.513)*** (0.789)* (1.685) (0.642)** (0.878)
Norway 1.416 1.973 4.908 4.714 0.557 3.492 3.298 0.935 -0.388 5.586 0.538 -1.323 4.651 -0.397
(0.437)*** (0.924)** (0.888)*** (1.052)*** (1.022) (0.990)*** (1.139)*** (0.385)** (1.167) (0.801)*** (0.929) (1.229) (0.889)*** (1.005)
Spain
b
1.006 1.608 0.814 2.837 0.602 -0.192 1.831 0.023 0.650 0.917 0.289 0.626 0.894 0.266
(0.303)*** (1.122) (0.428)* (0.898)*** (1.162) (0.524) (0.948)* (0.208) (0.988) (0.479)* (0.665) (1.009) (0.522)* (0.697)
Sweden 1.056 3.580 3.294 4.004 2.525 2.238 2.949 1.904 1.816 2.858 1.939 -0.087 0.954 0.035
(0.306)*** (2.354) (0.917)*** (0.892)*** (2.374) (0.966)** (0.943)*** (0.774)** (1.000)* (0.567)*** (0.554)*** (1.265) (0.959) (0.952)
Switzerland -2.489 0.063 -1.262 0.526 2.552 1.228 3.016 -0.194 1.984 -0.456 0.079 2.178 -0.261 0.274
(1.019)** (0.982) (1.141) (0.813) (1.415)* (1.529) (1.303)** (0.501) (1.154)* (0.633) (0.922) (1.258)* (0.807) (1.049)
UK 1.822 3.756 3.122 3.664 1.934 1.301 1.843 1.131 2.394 3.058 0.713 1.262 1.927 -0.418
(0.720)** (1.180)*** (0.496)*** (0.630)*** (1.382) (0.874) (0.957)* (0.574)* (1.389)* (0.751)*** (0.576) (1.503) (0.946)** (0.813)
EU 0.515 4.081 1.490 3.057 3.566 0.975 2.542 0.230 3.211 1.826 1.615 2.981 1.596 1.385
(0.287)* (0.804)*** (0.334)*** (0.559)*** (0.854)*** (0.440)** (0.628)*** (0.176) (0.913)*** (0.351)*** (0.392)*** (0.930)*** (0.393)*** (0.430)***
U.S. -0.452 2.944 2.214 1.535 3.396 2.666 1.987 0.216 4.891 5.153 1.510 4.675 4.937 1.294
(0.292) (1.301)** (0.578)*** (0.917)* (1.334)** (0.648)*** (0.962)** (0.243) (1.791)*** (0.645)*** (0.621)** (1.807)** (0.689)*** (0.667)*
a) 1991-95; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98
Notes: The dependent variable is yearly productivity growth. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are in brackets.
All estimations are done using weighted least squares, where employment is used as weights
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
Productivity Growth (1990-1995) Difference over non-ICT Services Difference over non-ICT Services Productivity Growth (1995-2000)
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Finally, we assessed the possibility that productivity growth accelerated between the 
second half and the first of the 1990s due to increased use of ICT. Such acceleration is found 
in the aggregate results for the United States, as well as in industry-specific work such as 
McGuckin and Stiroh (2001, 2002) and Stiroh (2001). For this purpose we transformed 
equation (5) by adding specific dummies to pick up differences in growth rates between the 
pre- and post 1995 period: 
 
t i t i D S D R D Q S R Q D P , 3 2 1 2 4 3 , e d d d g g g b a + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + + + + + = D   (6) 
 
where the parameter b  is the acceleration in productivity growth of non-ICT industries after 
1995,  1 d b +  is the acceleration for ICT-using industry in manufacturing,  2 d b +  is the 
acceleration for ICT-using services,  3 d b +  is the acceleration for other non-ICT industries, 
and  1 d , 2 d  and  3 d  are the additional accelerations of each industry group beyond the 
acceleration in non-ICT services. Table 10 confirms the earlier contribution analysis. Non-
ICT services experienced decelerating growth during the second half of the 1990s compared 
to the first half for most European countries, but not for Canada and the United States. Still 
only the United States showed an acceleration of productivity in ICT-using services that was 
significantly different from that in non-ICT services. In fact in Denmark, Japan, Sweden and 
Switzerland, ICT-using services showed deceleration relative to non-ICT services, even 
though none of these differences are statistically significant. 
 
In summary, the regressions show that the difference in productivity growth between 
ICT-using and non-ICT industries is in part linked to ICT-production. Quite apart from that, a 
sizeable number of countries also have shown significantly faster growth in ICT-using 
services compared to non-ICT services since 1995. This suggests that the diffusion of ICT in 
Europe is proceeding but at a slower pace than in the U.S. The U.S. stands out since it is the 
only country that also shows a significantly faster acceleration in ICT-using services 
compared to non-ICT services since 1995. In turn, this suggests that the diffusion of ICT in 
Europe has been “too slow” to accommodate the rapid improvement in employment growth in 
Europe since the 1990s. 
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Table 10: Impact of Non-ICT Services, ICT-using Manufacturing, ICT-using Services and other non-ICT 
Productivity Acceleration
Non-ICT ICT-using ICT-using Other ICT-using ICT-using Other
Services Manufct. Services non-ICT Manufct. Services non-ICT
Austria -0.336 3.929 -0.001 -0.861 4.265 0.335 -0.526
(0.902) (1.403)*** (0.802) (2.238) (1.668)** (1.207) (2.413)
Canada
b 0.148 0.015 1.057 0.759 -0.133 0.909 0.611
(0.668) (2.031) (1.152) (0.936) (2.138) (1.331) (1.150)
Denmark 1.089 -2.303 0.589 -1.009 -3.392 -0.500 -2.098
(1.887) (2.445) (1.389) (1.550) (3.088) (2.343) (2.442)
Finland -0.654 -0.719 1.291 -1.692 -0.065 1.944 -1.038
(0.467) (2.528) (1.969) (1.716) (2.571) (2.023) (1.779)
France
b 0.341 -0.220 0.430 -0.790 -0.561 0.088 -1.131
(0.656) (2.000) (0.986) (1.345) (2.105) (1.184) (1.496)
Germany
a -0.815 0.209 -0.220 -2.339 1.024 0.595 -1.524
(0.692) (1.892) (1.058) (1.453) (2.015) (1.264) (1.609)
Ireland 0.656 7.586 1.754 -1.483 6.930 1.099 -2.138
(1.535) (5.744) (2.026) (1.705) (5.945) (2.542) (2.294)
Italy -0.719 -1.911 -0.238 -1.347 -1.191 0.482 -0.628
(0.578) (1.317) (0.845) (1.009) (1.438) (1.024) (1.163)
Japan
c 0.608 3.166 -1.757 -1.387 2.558 -2.366 -1.995
(1.022) (3.158) (1.394) (1.493) (3.319) (1.728) (1.810)
Netherlands 0.286 -1.259 1.340 -0.387 -1.545 1.054 -0.673
(0.552) (1.903) (0.680)* (1.036) (1.982) (0.876) (1.174)
Norway -0.481 -2.360 0.678 -4.176 -1.879 1.158 -3.695
(0.582) (1.489) (1.196) (1.403)*** (1.598) (1.330) (1.519)**
Spain
b -0.983 -0.958 0.103 -2.549 0.024 1.086 -1.566
(0.368)*** (1.493) (0.642) (1.116)** (1.538) (0.740) (1.175)
Sweden 0.848 -1.767 -0.435 -2.064 -2.615 -1.283 -2.912
(0.832) (2.558) (1.078) (1.050)* (2.690) (1.362) (1.340)**
Switzerland 2.295 1.927 0.806 -0.448 -0.369 -1.489 -2.743
(1.135)** (1.515) (1.305) (1.229) (1.893) (1.729) (1.673)
UK -0.691 -1.363 -0.065 -2.952 -0.673 0.626 -2.261
(0.921) (1.822) (0.900) (0.854)*** (2.041) (1.287) (1.256)*
EU -0.285 -0.870 0.336 -1.442 -0.585 0.621 -1.157
(0.337) (1.216) (0.484) (0.683)** (1.262) (0.590) (0.761)
U.S. 0.669 1.947 2.939 -0.024 1.279 2.271 -0.693
(0.380)* (2.214) (0.866)*** (1.107) (2.246) (0.946)** (1.171)
a) 1991-95; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98
Notes: The dependent variable is yearly productivity growth.
 Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are in brackets.
All estimations are done using weighted least squares, where employment is used as weights
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
Acceleration in non-ICT Services (1995-2000 over 1990-1995)
Productivity Acceleration Difference over Productivity 
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4.  Is Diffusion is Europe Slower than in the U.S? 
 
Even though the grouping of industries based on ICT intensity is useful, it hides much of 
the variation within each of these groups. In this section we focus on individual industry 
performance for 51 of the 52 industries in our database.
33 Since we now deal with 16 
countries and 51 industries for two sub-periods (1990-1995 and 1995-2000), most of our 
discussion below centers on comparisons of industry averages for the eleven EU member 
countries and the U.S.  In addition, the discussion concentrates on services industries, which 
are among the largest users of ICT and which, because of their sheer size, are major 
contributors to aggregate productivity growth.
34 
 
Productivity Growth Rates by Industry 
Table 11 shows the labor productivity growth rates by industry for 1990-1995 and 1995-
2000, the accelerations between the two sub-periods, and the differential between the United 
States and the EU. Within each of the seven industry groupings, individual industries are 
ranked by the U.S. productivity growth rates from 1995-2000. 
 
ICT-Producing Industries 
In the ICT producing sector, both the U.S. and the EU show very strong productivity growth. 
Turning first to the ICT producing manufacturing industries, our attention is drawn to the very 
rapid productivity growth in office and computer equipment and semiconductors. These 
manufacturing industries clearly benefited from the rapid technological progress in ICT that 
lowered prices and led to increased adoption of these technologies. It is striking that the labor 
productivity growth rates in these industries for both the EU and the U.S are relatively close, 
but the acceleration of productivity growth in the ICT-producing manufacturing sector as a 
whole in the second half of the decade has been faster in the U.S.. Also noteworthy is the 
negative productivity growth in some of the ICT producing m anufacturing industries, like 
radio and TV equipment. The reason for the decline in productivity is that these industries 
make intensive use of semiconductors and other electronic components. While the prices of 
these inputs have spectacularly decreased, the output of these industries is valued at roughly 
unchanged prices. As a result, the (implicit) price of value added is rising rapidly and 
productivity is declining. 
 
                                                 
33 We excluded Private households (ISIC 95) because of missing data for many countries. 
34 See Appendix D for numbers for individual countries including the numbers for manufacturing 
industries.   28 
Table 11: Labor Productivity Growth and Productivity Differential for EU and US, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000
ISIC
Rev3 EU
a U.S. U.S.- EU
a U.S. U.S.- EU
a U.S. U.S.-
EU EU EU
Total Economy 1.9 1.1 -0.8 1.4 2.5 1.1 -0.5 1.4 1.9
ICT Producing Industries 6.7 8.1 1.4 8.7 10.1 1.4 2.0 2.0 0.0
Manufacturing 11.1 15.1 4.0 13.8 23.7 10.0 2.6 8.6 6.0
30 Computers 33.2 28.6 -4.6 49.3 52.3 3.0 16.1 23.7 7.6
321 Semiconductors 37.7 36.8 -1.0 56.4 52.1 -4.3 18.7 15.3 -3.4
322 Communication eq. 5.0 6.6 1.7 3.5 -0.4 -3.9 -1.5 -7.0 -5.6
313 Fiber optics 6.9 5.6 -1.3 2.9 5.7 2.8 -4.0 0.1 4.1
331 Instruments -2.6 -4.5 -1.9 -7.2 -5.9 1.3 -4.7 -1.4 3.3
323 Radio and TV eq. -2.6 -4.6 -2.1 -13.9 -12.5 1.4 -11.3 -7.9 3.4
Services 4.4 3.1 -1.3 6.5 1.8 -4.7 2.1 -1.4 -3.4
64 Telecommunications 5.7 3.3 -2.5 9.9 6.5 -3.4 4.2 3.2 -0.9
72 Computer services 1.5 2.7 1.2 1.5 -4.5 -6.0 0.0 -7.2 -7.2
ICT Using Industries
a
1.7 1.5 -0.2 1.6 4.7 3.2 -0.1 3.3 3.4
Manufacturing 3.1 -0.3 -3.4 2.1 1.2 -1.0 -1.0 1.4 2.4
31-31.3 Electrical machinery 2.2 0.5 -1.6 2.3 -0.7 -3.0 0.1 -1.3 -1.3
33-33.1 Watches & instruments 7.5 2.1 -5.3 5.1 14.2 9.1 -2.3 12.1 14.4
18 Apparel 5.2 3.4 -1.8 2.9 3.8 0.9 -2.4 0.3 2.7
36-37 Misc. manufacturing 1.1 1.3 0.3 1.5 2.4 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.6
353 Aircraft 0.5 -1.0 -1.5 6.4 1.1 -5.3 5.9 2.1 -3.8
29 Machinery 4.2 0.9 -3.3 1.0 0.3 -0.7 -3.3 -0.7 2.6
352+359 Railroad and other 5.9 -2.0 -7.9 3.1 -0.1 -3.1 -2.8 1.9 4.8
22 Printing & Publishing 1.9 -2.6 -4.6 2.5 -0.2 -2.7 0.5 2.4 1.9
351 Ships 4.1 -3.8 -7.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -3.8 3.6 7.4
Services 1.1 1.9 0.8 1.4 5.4 4.0 0.3 3.5 3.2
67 Securities trade 1.1 3.2 2.1 2.0 15.3 13.4 0.9 12.1 11.3
52 Retail trade 1.1 2.3 1.2 1.4 6.9 5.5 0.3 4.7 4.4
51 Wholesale trade 2.9 3.4 0.5 1.2 6.1 4.9 -1.7 2.7 4.4
65 Banks 0.4 1.3 0.9 3.0 2.8 -0.2 2.6 1.5 -1.0
73 R&D -0.2 1.0 1.2 -0.5 3.1 3.6 -0.3 2.1 2.4
741-743 Professional services -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.8 0.9
71 Renting of machinery 2.4 6.7 4.2 0.5 5.7 5.2 -2.0 -1.0 1.0
66 Insurance 0.2 3.0 2.8 0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.1 -4.0 -3.9
Non-ICT Industries 1.6 0.2 -1.4 0.7 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 0.2 1.1
Manufacturing 3.8 3.0 -0.8 1.5 1.4 -0.1 -2.4 -1.6 0.7
24 Chemicals 6.8 3.4 -3.4 4.7 4.4 -0.4 -2.0 1.0 3.0
25 Rubber & plastics 3.2 4.6 1.4 1.6 4.1 2.5 -1.6 -0.5 1.1
17 Textiles 3.5 3.0 -0.4 1.4 3.3 2.0 -2.1 0.3 2.4
27 Basic metals 6.9 3.9 -3.0 0.9 3.1 2.2 -6.0 -0.8 5.2
26 Stone, clay & glass 2.5 2.8 0.3 1.4 2.6 1.3 -1.1 -0.2 1.0
23 Petroleum & coal 9.6 5.0 -4.5 0.2 1.5 1.3 -9.3 -3.5 5.8
34 Motor vehicles 3.2 4.9 1.7 0.9 1.4 0.5 -2.3 -3.5 -1.2
19 Leather 3.3 4.9 1.6 0.7 1.3 0.5 -2.5 -3.6 -1.1
28 Fabricated metals 2.2 3.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 -0.3 -1.3 -2.6 -1.3
20 Wood 2.5 -2.8 -5.3 2.7 0.3 -2.4 0.1 3.1 2.9
21 Paper 3.5 0.0 -3.5 2.3 0.2 -2.1 -1.2 0.2 1.4
15-16 Food & beverages 2.9 3.5 0.6 0.0 -4.5 -4.5 -2.9 -8.0 -5.1
Services 0.6 -0.4 -0.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.8 1.2
70 Real estate -0.7 1.6 2.3 -0.8 1.7 2.5 -0.1 0.1 0.2
60-63 Transportation 3.2 2.1 -1.1 1.7 1.6 0.0 -1.5 -0.4 1.0
55 Hotels & restaurants -1.8 -1.1 0.7 -1.2 0.4 1.6 0.6 1.5 0.9
95 Private households 2.2 0.7 -1.5
75 Government 1.4 0.0 -1.4 1.1 0.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.3 0.6
74.9 Other business services -1.1 -1.0 0.1 -0.3 1.4 1.7 0.8 2.4 1.6
85 Health 0.8 -2.2 -2.9 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 1.9 2.3
80 Education 0.9 -0.2 -1.1 -0.1 -1.2 -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 0.0
50 Repairs -0.1 -1.4 -1.2 1.0 -2.5 -3.4 1.1 -1.1 -2.2
90-93 Personal & social serv. -0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 -1.2
Other non-ICT industries 2.7 0.7 -2.0 1.9 0.6 -1.3 -0.8 -0.1 0.7
01-05 Agriculture 5.2 -1.0 -6.3 4.0 6.3 2.3 -1.3 7.3 8.5
40-41 Utilities 4.5 2.5 -2.0 4.9 2.3 -2.7 0.5 -0.2 -0.7
45 Construction 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
10-14 Mining 7.5 5.4 -2.1 3.5 -1.8 -5.4 -3.9 -7.2 -3.3
Note: EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
 and the United Kingdom. See Appendix B for notes on data and methods
1990-1995 1995-2000 Acceleration
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While the ICT-producing services industries showed notably slower productivity 
growth than the ICT producing manufacturing industries, ICT-producing services clearly 
stand out compared to other services industries. This can be mainly attributed to the strong 
productivity growth in the telecommunications sector. While this industry had fast 
productivity growth in both the EU and the U.S., the EU had a clear advantage over the 
United States in particular because of the rapid take off of the wireless market. From 1995-
2000 Europe showed positive productivity growth rates in computer services,  whereas 




The ICT-using ector (excluding the ICT-producing industries) was the sector in which the 
U.S. showed the most clear-cut performance advantage over the EU. Most U.S. 
manufacturing and service industries in this group showed a faster acceleration in productivity 
growth than the EU after 1995. 
 
In ICT-using manufacturing productivity growth accelerated faster in the U.S., with the 
exception of the “other electrical machinery” industry and the aircraft industry. However, 
these widespread gains in the U.S. come against the backdrop of generally lower productivity 
growth compared to the EU.. Even from 1995-2000 U.S. productivity growth in mostICT-
using manufacturing industries was still lower than in Europe. 
 
The story is much different for ICT-using services (other than ICT-producing) where the 
EU experienced a negligible improvement in productivity growth of 0.3 %-point compared to 
an increase of 3.5 %-points in the U.S. Some individual industries of course show bigger 
differences.  For example, the United States experienced the strongest productivity growth in 
securities trade, and wholesale and retail trade. In fact all ICT-using services but two (renting 
of machinery and insurance) show acceleration in labor productivity growth in the United 
States, whereas in the European Union most of these industries experienced a decelerating 
growth performance. 
 
The strong acceleration of productivity in trade is recognized in the U.S. literature.
36 
Europe’s very slow productivity growth in this sector is a key factor in explaining the 
economy-wide differences in productivity acceleration in the late 1990s. In fact, as we will 
see below, the trade sector and securities together account for the largest part of the whole 
difference in productivity growth between Europe and the United States since 1995. 
 
The banking sector was the only ICT-using service industry (excluding ICT-producing) 
for which the EU showed acceleration in productivity growth after 1995, which was also 
higher than in the United States. The higher productivity growth in banking for the EU 
reflects the experience of most EU member states, except Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands 
                                                 
35 But recently concerns have surfaced concerning the still too fragmented market structure of the 
European telecom market. See, for example, Isern and Rios (2002).  
36 See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (2001)   30 
(see Appendix D). Part of Europe’s higher growth rate in banking is due to restructuring of 
the sector, which led to a continuous fall in employment with little offset in measured output. 
In contrast, employment in U.S. banking increased since 1995. In banking, measurement 
issues are of major concern. Strikingly, the Netherlands is among the few countries that (like 
the United States) recently shifted from measuring real output in the banking sector based on 
deflated interest receipts and service charges to genuine volume measures of banking output. 
Hence some of the differences across countries may reflect measurement procedures. 
 
Non-ICT Industries  
In the “non-ICT” sector (representing the less intensive users of ICT) there are substantial 
differences in productivity growth across industries, with mostly b etter productivity 
performance in manufacturing industries (such as chemicals and textiles) than in service 
industries, particularly in the 1990-95 period. The differences between the manufacturing and 
service non-ICT sectors narrowed considerably in the 1995-2000 period in both the U.S. and 
the EU. There was also a narrowing of the differences in productivity growth rates between 
the EU and the U.S. as U.S. productivity growth slowed less in non-ICT manufacturing and 
even modestly accelerated in non-ICT services.  Nonetheless, compared to the ICT-using 
sector both the EU and the U.S. showed slower productivity growth throughout the non-ICT 
sector. 
 
Given their sheer size, services industries are mainly responsible for the overall slower 
growth of productivity in the non-ICT sector compared to the ICT-using sector. 
Unfortunately, measurement issues cloud interpretation of the differences. While 
measurement of service sector output is a problem in the ICT-using sector, for some of the 
non-ICT service sectors these problems may be even bigger. One of the major issues is that 
the real output of services sectors is still largely based on information on inputs (such as 
employment input and labor income). While in both in Europe and the United States 
improvements in measurement of non-market services output are discussed, for example, in 
health and education, details on the actual implementation of improved measurement methods 
in the national accounts are often missing.
37 Since it is likely that the problems in developing 
suitable output measures are similar across countries, we can only assume that progress 
towards solutions is not all that different.  
 
Table 11 shows that the average productivity growth for a considerable part of non-ICT 
services in the U.S. was lower than in the EU, particularly in health, repairs, education, and 
personal and social services. The latter may simply reflect faster growth of nominal wages in 
Europe (i.e., it is a measurement problem), but there may also be explanations of a more 
economic nature. For example, employment in education, health, personal and social services 
                                                 
37 In the United States, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (which is responsible for the development 
of price indices) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (which produces the National Income and 
Product Accounts) have introduced various improvements in measurement methods (Dean, 1999; 
Gullickson and Harper, 1999; Landefeld and Fraumeni, 2001). In a series of reports, Eurostat recently 
evaluated measurement practices in various service activities, such as financial services and public 
services (Eurostat, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001).    31 
and government has increased much more slowly in Europe than in the United States since 
1995, although the difference in employment growth rates for these industries diminished as 
European employment growth at least turned positive since 1995. There is also some scattered 
– and partly anecdotal  – evidence of greater efficiency in terms of output per person in 
European health and education services.
38 At the same time, productivity in some non-ICT 
services in the United States (in particular health  – though still negative  – and non-ICT 
business services) improved much more since 1995 than in the EU. But clearly all these 
measures are unlikely to take adequate account of quality improvements so that these 
arguments should not be pushed too far.  
 
What is clear, however, is that the largest part of the observed difference in productivity 
performance between Europe and the U.S. arises from the much better performance of ICT-
using services relative to non-ICT services in the U.S.  While ICT-using services performed 
better than the non-ICT services in both the U.S. and the EU in 1995-2000, the differential 
was greater in the U.S. (1.2% in the EU versus 5.0% in the U.S.)  Moreover, U.S. productivity 
accelerated in both sectors, though by substantially more in ICT-using (3.5 % in ICT-services 
versus 0.8% in non-ICT services).  At the same time European productivity growth more or 
less stalled in ICT-using services, and decelerated in non-ICT services (from 0.6% to 0.2%).  
 
Industry Contribution to the U.S. - EU Productivity Growth Differential 
While the differences in performance between ICT and non-ICT services is a primary factor 
in accounting for the aggregate productivity growth differential between the U.S. and the EU 
since 1995, it is largely driven by a limited number of industries. In order to examine the 
importance of particular industries accounting for the rise in the productivity gap between 
Europe and the United States between 1995 and 2000, we return to our decomposition 
analysis  – introduced by equations (1) and (2) in Section 3. Using this decomposition, 
aggregate productivity growth in both countries was allocated to the 50 industries used in the 
industry-by-industry analysis. 
 
By taking the difference between the EU and the U.S. in terms of industry contributions 
to aggregate productivity growth, we can allocate the aggregate difference in productivity 
growth between the U.S. and the EU (which was of 1.1 percentage points from 1995-2000) to 
the individual industries. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figures 2a to 2c. Figure 
2a shows the contribution to the U.S.-EU productivity differential from ICT-using services 
(including ICT-producing services). Figure 2b provides the same information for non-ICT 
services. The analysis is extended to ICT-using manufacturing in Figure 2c. 
 
Figure 2a shows that securities, retail, and wholesale trade contributed more than 0.90 
percentage points less to aggregate productivity growth in Europe than in the United States. 
This number is close to the overall productivity differential of 1.1 percentage points between 
the U.S. and the EU from 1995-2000. Figure 2b shows that most non-ICT services in Europe 
                                                 
38 But in health services, some countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) showed an even faster 
decline in labor productivity than the United States since 1995.   32 
show faster productivity growth than in the U.S., offsetting part of the slower growth in 
Europe’s ICT-using services. Figure 2c shows that office and computer machinery and 
semiconductors add substantially to the U.S.-EU productivity differential, but the 
contributions of other manufacturing industries to the differences in productivity growth 
between the EU and the U.S. are small.   33 
Figure 2a, Contribution of ICT-using services to U.S.-EU Productivity Differential, 1995-
2000
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Source: See Appendix Table E.5  34 
Figure 2b, Contribution of Non-ICT services to U.S.-EU Productivity Differential, 1995-2000
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Figure 2c, Contribution of ICT-using manufacturing to U.S.-EU Productivity Differential, 
1995-2000
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Electr. Mach. (-0.016, -0.003)
Machinery (-0.014, -0.008)
Printing&Publishing (-0.033, 0.001)  37 
 
Apart from calculating the differences in the industry contributions to the aggregate 
growth differential, we can also provide insight into what is driving these differences. In 
Appendix E we describe a methodology for decomposing the difference in industry 
contribution to the growth differential between two countries into four effects. From equation 
(2) it follows that an industry can have a bigger contribution to aggregate growth because 1) 
its productivity growth is higher, 2) its share in total employment is higher, 3) its productivity 
level is higher or 4) because the industry has expanded its employment share. We can 
therefore attribute differences in an industry’s contribution to cross-country differences to 
each of these four factors. 
 
We distinguish between these four effects by running counterfactual shift-share analyses. 
The employment shares of the U.S. are imposed on the EU and vice-versa. By comparing the 
“intra-effect” using the same employment shares, we isolate the effect of differences in 
productivity growth. The remaining difference in the intra-effect is then due to differences in 
the employment share. By comparing the “shift-effect” with identical employment shares, the 
productivity level effect is identified. Likewise, the remaining difference in the shift-effect is 
due to changing employment shares. In the end, we take the average of each of the effects 
under U.S. and EU employment shares.
39 
 
In Figure 2a, we not only show the total difference in contribution, but also (between 
brackets) the part that is due to higher or lower productivity growth. The second figure in 
brackets is the sum of the remaining three effects.
40 As Figure 2a shows, the majority of the 
difference in contribution can be explained by differences in productivity growth. This is 
especially true in the two trade industries and to a lesser extent for the other industries. 
 
Figure 2b shows that in non-ICT services the contributions of individual industries 
generally have a small effect on the aggregate U.S.-EU productivity differential. The largest 
positive impact on the U.S.-EU gap is real estate contributing 0.09 percentage points to the 
productivity growth differential. In this case a much lower productivity growth rate in the EU 
(-0.8% versus 1.7% in the U.S.) has a reduced impact because of the smaller size of the 
industry in the EU. The majority of industries in non-ICT services grouping in fact narrow the 
gap between the EU and the U.S.. As mentioned above, although the productivity differentials 
have become smaller relative to the 1990-1995 period, most non-ICT services have shown 
faster productivity growth in the EU than in the U.S. between 1995-2000. 
 
Figure 2c shows that ICT-using manufacturing industries (including ICT-producing) also 
account for part of the aggregate productivity differential. Here the role of the semiconductor 
industry is especially noteworthy. Its contribution to the U.S.-EU growth differential is 
actually the largest of all industries. This is mostly because the U.S. industry has a much 
                                                 
39 See Appendix E for a detailed explanation. 
40  See Appendix Table E5 for the separate effects by industry.   38 
larger employment share than in the EU (0.4 versus 0.2 percent of employment).
41 The 
computer industry also makes a considerable contribution to the difference between the U.S. 
and EU, but the remainder of the industries makes only limited contributions. This is because 
differences in productivity growth rates between the U.S. and the EU are not as large as those 
found in ICT-using services. In addition, the size differences between the EU and the U.S. in 
ICT manufacturing are much smaller than those in ICT services. 
 
Testing the “Lagging Diffusion” Hypothesis for Europe 
While so far we have presented some evidence from industry l abor productivity data 
supporting the idea that diffusion rates for ICT have been slower in the Europe than in the 
U.S., the direct evidence is relatively sparse. But the evidence that labor productivity growth, 
and changes in growth rates, are linked to ICT-using and ICT-producing industries extend to 
Europe. Moreover the differences in productivity performance between the EU and the U.S. 
are strongly associated with major ICT-using industries, particularly trade and securities. We 
conclude this line of reasoning by looking at the patterns of productivity growth across the 
entire distribution of industries. 
 
Table 12 provides correlations of productivity growth between the E.U. and the U.S. for 
all industries, for all industries with the two major ICT-producing industries (office and 
computer equipment, and semiconductors) omitted, and for service industries only. The first 
column shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients for productivity growth rates and the 
second and third columns provide Pearson correlations on productivity growth rates and 
productivity contributions respectively. The calculations are carried out on productivity 
growth in EU and U.S. between 1995 and 2000, on acceleration in productivity growth in 
1995-2000 relative to 1990-1995, and on EU productivity growth from 1995-2000 relative to 
U.S. growth from 1990-1995. The latter type of correlation comes closest to the “lagging 
diffusion” hypothesis as it tests whether the EU growth pattern during the second period 
resembles the U.S. growth pattern during the first period. 
 
                                                 
41 Productivity growth in the semiconductor industry also contributes positively  to the U.S.-EU 
differential. While Table 11 shows higher productivity growth in the EU, the shift-share analysis 
decomposes the absolute change in productivity (value added per person in currency units) in each 
industry. Despite the higher European growth rates, the U.S. semiconductor industry has shown a 
larger absolute increase in productivity.   39 
Table 12: Correlation between EU and US Productivity Growth by Industry
Spearman
Rank On productivity On contributions




EU and US (1995-2000) 0.47** 0.95** 0.61**
EU and US Acceleration 1995-2000/1990-95 0.47** 0.70** 0.24*
EU (1995-2000) and US (1990-95) 0.31** 0.92** 0.58**
All industries (except 30 and 32.1)
EU and US (1995-2000) 0.40** 0.60** 0.51**
EU and US Acceleration 1995-2000/1990-95 0.40** 0.38** 0.15
EU (1995-2000) over US (1990-95) 0.23 0.40** 0.48**
Service industries
EU and US (1995-2000) 0.36** 0.35** 0.35**
EU and US Acceleration 1995-2000/1990-95 0.26 0.27* 0.22
EU (1995-2000) over US (1990-95) 0.50** 0.33** 0.38**




Reading across the top panel of Table 12, which shows the correlations when all 
industries are included, the relationships are positive and, when the productivity growth 
measure (in column 2) is used, in fact quite strong. However, as is shown in the second panel, 
the originally high correlation coefficients in column (2) drop significantly once the office 
and computer equipment (ISIC 30) and semiconductors (ISIC 321) are dropped from the 
sample. While the Spearman coefficient (column 1) in the second panel drops somewhat, the 
Pearson correlations on productivity contributions in column (3) (which take account of the 
relative size of industries) hold up fairly well. In particular the correlation between EU and 
U.S. productivity growth rates in the 1995-2000 period, and the comparison of the EU 
productivity growth rates in 1995-2000 with those in the U.S. in the earlier period, 1990-
1995, remain strongly significant.
42 
 
In the third panel of Table 12 we concentrate on the services industries only, and find 
again that the results support the argument that Europe’s diffusion process is ongoing but 
lagging behind that of the U.S. In particular, the correlations are uniformly positive and 
follow a reasonable pattern for comparisons of EU growth from 1995-2000 with U.S. growth 
from 1990-1995.  While the correlation coefficients are somewhat smaller than in the other 
two panels, they are still significantly positive. 
                                                 
42 The acceleration test performs badly across the board, which is no surprise given the slowdown of 
productivity growth in many European industries and the acceleration in many U.S. industries since 
1995 (see Table 11)   40 
5.  Concluding Comments and Further Research 
 
The main conclusion from this paper is that the diffusion of ICT in Europe is underway. It is 
following patterns similar to those experienced in the U.S., but the pace is considerably 
slower overall.  
 
ICT production, particularly the computers and semiconductor industries, showed strong 
productivity growth and acceleration in virtually all countries. The contribution of these 
industries to aggregate productivity growth was higher in the U.S. due to their larger size. But 
in many European countries ICT-producing services industries (in particular 
telecommunication services) performed better than in the U.S.. This suggests support for 
countries that are primarily users and that do not rely on a major computer-producing 
industry. 
 
The key differences between Europe and the U.S. are in the services sector, in particular 
in intensive ICT-using services. Productivity growth in the U.S. strongly accelerated during 
the second half of the decade, whereas it more or less stalled in the EU. While there was great 
diversity among industries and countries, a couple of patterns stand out. The U.S., in contrast 
to Europe, showed strong productivity improvements in retail and wholesale trade and 
securities. Moreover, even though these sectors were larger in the U.S., it was productivity, 
not size d ifferences, that explained most of the difference in the aggregate productivity 
growth rates between the U.S. and the EU since 1995. In addition, there were almost universal 
productivity gains in banking but very mixed performances in insurance and securities 
services, with the larger countries, including the U.S., doing poorly in the insurance industry. 
 
Clear patterns were less obvious among the non-ICT industries. Productivity 
performances were very mixed across industries, but on the whole Europe showed higher 
productivity growth in both 1990-95 and 1995-2000. The gap narrowed, however, as the U.S. 
was one of the few countries to show some improvement in productivity growth for the 
aggregate of non-ICT services.  
 
These results raise several questions that deserve further research. First, how important 
are measurement issues as contrasted with economic explanations in explaining our findings?  
We cannot be sure how much of the differences we observe are the result of inadequate 
measurement of services output and differences across countries in measurement 
methodology. It is clear that the measurement issues need to remain a key item on the future 
agenda for productivity research.  The importance of services industries in accounting for the 
U.S.–EU gap in aggregate productivity growth underscores the central role that measurement 
issues are to take in the research agenda.  
 
Second, why was ICT diffusion faster in the U.S.? It is clear that ICT equipment is sold 
in worldwide markets and that European productivity growth in manufacturing matches that 
in the U.S. This means the technology is available to potential users about everywhere.   41 
Moreover stronger productivity performance in European ICT-producing services, in 
particular telecom services, suggests plenty of support for ICT-users.  
 
Finally, despite the importance of ICT, it should be noted that ICT is not the only factor 
explaining differences in productivity growth between Europe and the U.S.  A broad literature 
has addressed a wide range of causes for Europe’s slowdown in productivity growth during 
the 1990s. In turn, these same factors may be behind the slower diffusion of ICT in Europe 
compared to the U.S.
43 Indeed business organization and the opportunities to exploit 
technologies depend on the constraints and restrictions that firms face. For example, 
McGuckin and van Ark (2001) argue that in many European industries regulations and 
structural impediments in product and labor markets limit the opportunities to invest in ICT.  
Examples of product market restrictions include limits on shop opening hours, and transport 
regulations that make it difficult for manufacturers and wholesalers to supply customers 
frequently. Restrictive labor rules and procedures limit flexibility in organizing the workplace 
and hiring and firing of workers. Furthermore, barriers to entry and restrictions on the free 
flow of capital are still an issue in many countries. We note that such queries would not just 
focus on European rigidities.  The relatively poor performance of telecom services in the U.S. 
may be associated with cable and broad-spectrum regulations and the lack of universal 
standards that limit entry and competition in telecommunications services. 
 
More research on these issues may also help with the related question posed in the paper: 
How was the U.S. was able to simultaneously expand employment in industries such as retail 
trade and increase labor productivity? In Europe it appears that the slower pace of ICT 
diffusion meant that employment gains went together with declining productivity. This slower 
pace involves a risk that Europe may enter a low-productivity growth path, which will make it 
difficult to raise output and living standards in the long run.  
. 
                                                 
43 A useful summary is in Scarpetta et al. (2000).   42 
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7.  Appendices 
 
Appendix A: ICT Classifications and ICT Intensity 
 
Appendix Table A1: ICT Industry Grouping on basis of ISIC Rev. 3
(1=ICT-producing or ICT-using ; 0=non-ICT)
ISIC Industry Stiroh (2001) Our
01-05 AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 0 0
10-14 MINING AND QUARRYING 0 0
15-16 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 0/1 0
17 TEXTILES 0 0
18 WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING AND DYING OF FUR 1 1
19 LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS AND FOOTWEAR 0 0
20 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 0 0
21 PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS 0 0
22 PRINTING & PUBLISHING 1 1
23 COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 0 0
24 CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 0 0
25 RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 0 0
26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 0 0
27 BASIC METALS 0 0
28 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except machinery and equipment 0 0
29 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, NEC 1 1
30 OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY 1 1
31 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC 1 1
313 Fiber optics 1 1
31-313 Electrical machinery and apparatus, excl. fiber optics 1 1
32 RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 1 1
33 MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 1 1
331 Medical, measuring and industrial control instruments 1 1
33-331 Medical, precision and optical instruments excl. other instruments 1 1
34 MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 0 0
35 OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 1 1
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 1 1
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 1 1
352+359 Railroad equipment and other transport equipment, nec 1 1
36-37 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 1 1
40-41 ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 0 0
45 CONSTRUCTION 0 0
50 REPAIRS 0/1 0
51 WHOLESALE TRADE 1 1
52 RETAIL TRADE  1 1
55 HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 0 0
60-63 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 0/1 0
64 POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 1
65 FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION except insurance and pension funding 1 1
66 INSURANCE AND PENSION FUNDING, except compulsory social security 1 1
67 ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 1 1
70 REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 0 0
71 RENTING OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1 1
72 COMPUTER AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 1 1
73 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1 1
74 OTHER BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 1 0/1
741-743 Professional Service 1 1
749 Other business activities, excl. professional 1 0
75 PUBLIC ADMIN AND DEFENCE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY na 0
80 EDUCATION 1 0
85 HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 1 0
90-93 OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES na/0/1 0
95 PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH EMPLOYED PERSONS 0 0
99 EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BODIES 0 0
Notes: “na” means that Stiroh (2001) did not classify this industry due to a lack of investment data by type. “0/1” means that 
part of this ISIC industry was classified by Stiroh (2001) as non-ICT, but another part as ICT intensive in Stiroh (2001).
 “na/0/1” is analogous and also includes not classified industries.    46 
Appendix Table A.2: IT investment as a % of total investment by industry
IT investment as a % of total investment
US France Germany Netherlands UK
ISIC rev.3 1993-1997 1993-1997 1991-1994 1990-1995 1993-1997
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 01-05 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4%
MINING AND QUARRYING 10-14 1.4% 1.6% 0.1%
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 15-16 3.1% 1.6% 3.0% 3.1% 5.2%
TEXTILES, APPAREL AND LEATHER 17-19 6.1% 6.7% 5.2% 11.0%
TEXTILES AND APPAREL 17-18 6.1% 9.9% 6.6% 9.6%
TEXTILES 17 4.7% 6.3%
WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING AND DYING OF FUR 18 14.5% 7.8%
LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS AND FOOTWEAR 19 6.5% 8.1% 25.6%
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 20 3.0% 6.4% 2.8% 3.3% 6.1%
PAPER, PRINTING & PUBLISHING 21-22 7.3% 4.9% 6.8% 11.7%
PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 21 2.1% 6.7% 3.9%
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 22 13.3% 4.1% 8.1%
CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL PRODUCTS 23-25 3.3% 1.7% 3.0% 4.9% 5.6%
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL23 1.2% 1.7% 10.5% 0.5%
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 24 3.8% 2.5% 4.5% 8.3%
RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 25 3.0% 5.0% 2.7% 7.1%
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 26 3.0% 2.0% 6.2%
BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 27-28 3.8% 2.5% 6.3% 6.4% 6.1%
BASIC METALS 27 2.4% 3.8% 10.8%
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except machinery and equipment28 5.1% 8.3% 4.6%
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND OFFICE AND COMP EQ 29 15.8%
a
7.1% 9.8% 16.2%
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 30-33 9.6% 2.0% 10.2% 6.9% 15.4%
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND RADIO, TV AND COMM EQ 31-32 7.0%
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 33 12.2%
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 34-35 3.9% 2.1% 6.3% 4.0% 5.8%
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 34 2.0% 6.4%
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 35 9.1% 5.8%
BUILDING AND REPAIRING OF SHIPS AND BOATS 351 2.0%
AIRCRAFT AND SPACECRAFT 353 9.7%
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT  352+359 5.5%
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 36-37 5.8% 7.4% 6.8%
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 40-41 1.9% 5.1% 0.4% 1.6% 4.2%
CONSTRUCTION 45 3.4% 1.7% 2.1% 5.8% 5.1%
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIRS  50-52 9.8% 1.8% 10.8% 6.0% 10.0%
REPAIRS 50 1.3% 4.0%
WHOLESESALE TRADE 51 15.6% 11.0%
RETAIL TRADE 52 5.3% 4.0%
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 55 1.9% 1.9% 1.4% 2.3% 0.5%
TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 60-64 2.6% 2.3% 0.8% 2.4% 11.6%
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 60-63 2.0% 0.9%
POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 64 2.7% 0.6%
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 65-67 13.6% 21.5% 13.1% 20.2% 20.3%
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION except insurance and pension funding 65 14.5% 15.0% 26.7%
INSURANCE AND PENSION FUNDING, except compulsory social security 66 12.4% 7.9% 12.5%
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 67 3.2% 14.0% 10.9%
REAL ESTATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 70-74 8.6% 0.6% 2.1% 10.4% 16.7%




RENTING OF M&EQ AND OTHER BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 71-74 16.1% 2.9% 8.4% 13.4% 38.7%
RENTING OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 71 1.3%
COMPUTER AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 72 68.7%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 73 24.5%
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 74.1-74.3 18.7%
OTHER BUSINESS ACTIVITIES (non-professional) 74.9 5.1%
PUBLIC ADMIN AND DEFENCE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY 75 NA 2.6% NA
EDUCATION 80 6.7% 3.2%
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 85 6.1% 1.9% 3.3%
OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES 90-93 3.5% 6.3%
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH EMPLOYED PERSONS 95 NA
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BODIES 99 NA
Notes: a: includes office and computing machinery (ISIC 30) as well; b: assumed to be equal to 0
Source: US: BEA, Germany: Ifo Investorenrechnung. France, Netherlands, UK: Data from national statistical offices    47 
Appendix B: Data description 
 
General 
The main data on value added in current and constant prices and employment by industry for 
this study are obtained from the OECD STructural ANalysis (STAN) database.
44 This 
database, which is largely based on national accounts of individual OECD member states, 
provides a comprehensive tool for analyzing industrial performance at a relatively detailed 
level of activity across countries using the ISIC Rev. 3 industry classification.
45 Even though 
STAN mostly goes back to 1970, our data so far only cover the period 1990-2000. For a 
number of countries, however, we only have data up to 1998 or 1999 (see below). 
 
The STAN database does not show separate entries for five of the six ICT producing 
industries (semiconductors, 321; communication equipment, 322, fiber optics, 313; radio and 
TV equipment, 323; and instruments, 331), for repairs, wholesale and retail trade (50, 51 and 
52) and “other” business services (professional services 741-9). For some countries there 
were also missing disaggregations for other industries, for example basic metals and 
fabricated metals (27 and 28). We generally break these industries out by using the share in 
value added and employment which we then apply to the aggregate from STAN. Although the 
data sources differ between countries, for breaking out the manufacturing industries, we 
commonly rely on value added at current prices and employment from the OECD Structural 
Statistics for Industry and Services (I&S, 2000). For services, we mostly used the OECD 
Services Statistics on Value Added and Employment (SerNA, 2001), which also provides 
value added in constant prices. The I&S data cover at most 1991-1998, while SerNA covers 
1990-1999. For years outside this range, or in cases for which no data are available for 
particular years, we extrapolate by the change in value added and employment shares. Only 
when data are available for less than four years, the share itself is assumed constant over time. 
 
In cases where the more detailed data sources did not provide value added estimates in 
constant prices, we used the deflator for the aggregate industry groups. However, this 
procedure is inadequate for ICT-producing industries (30, 313, 31ex313, 321, 322, 323, 331 
and 33ex331) for which price changes are very different from those for the aggregate industry 
groups to which they belong. The large quality improvements of ICT equipment have led to 
very rapid price declines. Unlike traditional matched models the quality changes are better 
picked up by hedonic price indexes, which are estimates of price changes based on changes in 
the quality characteristics of ICT equipment. Whereas the U.S. National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) make extensive use of hedonic price indexes, most other countries do not 
use independent hedonic price indices, which implies that their deflators for computers, 
electrical machinery, telecom equipment and instruments for many countries did not decline 
                                                 
44 See  http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-1-3245-0,00.html. For 
the Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland the national accounts of each country were used. In some 
cases (for example, for Sweden and the UK) STAN was supplemented with more recent data for the 
countries’ national accounts.   48 
or declined much less than in the United States. Since this would understate productivity 
growth in other countries relative to the US, we applied the U.S. deflators for ICT-producing 
industries (30, 313, 31ex313, 32, 331 and 33ex331) to these industries in all countries. In 
order to correct for differences in overall inflation between each country and the U.S., we 
adjusted these hedonic deflators for the ratio of the GDP price indexes of each country and the 
U.S..
46. Since the ICT-producing industries are not separately distinguished in the U.S. NIPA, 
we constructed these deflators using price changes in output and intermediate inputs of ICT 
goods. We did this in a fashion that approximates the BEA procedures and results as closely 
as possible. We describe the details below in the overall description of the U.S. data. 
 
Finally, in (re)calculating aggregates for industry groups and for the aggregate economy 
we used chain-weighted Törnqvist quantity indices for value added in constant prices. This 
implies that the sum of individual industries does not exactly sum to the original total of a 
group or sector. 
 
Additional sources for individual countries 
Below more detailed information is provided on the specific procedures used for each country 
in the construction of the data, in addition to the general procedure outlined above.
47 Table B1 
below shows for which industries additional data was used, the source of this data, how many 
years were available and the variables available from this source.  
 
Austria 
For industries in 31-33, the years that were not available were extrapolated with the change in 
shares over that period; 1996 was interpolated. For the industries in 50-52 and 74, the shares 
were assumed to have remained constant before 1997 and after 1998. For these industries, the 




In the STAN file for this country, miscellaneous manufacturing includes instruments, so these 
were split up using I&S. Repairs, securities trade and professional services could not be 
distinguished separately. Real estate only consists of owner-occupied dwellings so no 
corresponding employment figures are available. This industry has therefore been omitted 
from the database and the total economy figures have been adjusted accordingly. At present, 
value added in current prices is available only up to 1996 (the year of the most recent I/O 
                                                                                                                                            
45 In the remainder, any numbers that do not refer to years, are ISIC rev3 codes for the industries in 
question. 
46 This procedure is based on Schreyer (2000), although he uses each country’s deflator for non-ICT 
investment relative to that of the USA as a correction factor. As we do not have non-ICT investment 
deflators for each country, we use the ratio of the overall GDP (excluding ICT producing industries) 
deflators 
47 In the following, the abbreviations Cur, Con and Emp refer to respectively value added in current 
prices, value added in constant prices and persons employed. I&S refers to the OECD  Structural 
Statistics for Industry and Services, SerNA for the OECD  Service Statistics on Value Added and 
Employment and PPI for weights from the producer price index.   49 
table). Value added in constant prices has been extrapolated by Statistics Canada. To derive 
estimates of value added at current prices, we use PPIs for manufacturing industries and data 
on value added in current prices for broad sectors directly obtained from Statistics Canada. 
For employment, only information for broad sectors are available, directly obtained from 
Statistics Canada. Shares at the lower levels of aggregation were extrapolated. For I&S data, 
shares were assumed to have remained constant before 1994 and after 1995. Shares from 
SerNA were extrapolated. 
 
Denmark 
Employment shares were used in 31-33 for value added in current prices as well. For 31-33, 
missing years in I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the available years 
 
Finland 




In the STAN file for this country, mining (10-14) is partly included in petroleum and coal 
products (23) and partly in non-metallic mineral products (26). We use detailed national 
accounts data to break out this industry. For 1990-1991, we use the shares from I&S to 
extrapolate. Similarly, private households (95) is included in personal & social services (90-
93). This industry is also broken out with detailed national accounts data and extrapolated 
using SerNA. Finally, data on value added in constant prices were extrapolated for 1990 for a 
number of detailed industries using the average deflator change over the rest of the decade. 
 
Germany 
For 31-33, missing years in I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the 
available years. To split up business services (74) we (arbitrarily) assumed professional 
services (741-743) makes up half of the total. 
 
Ireland 
We used separate national accounts data for this country, since there is no data in STAN yet. 
The metal industry (27-28) and transport equipment (34-35) were split up using I&S. Missing 
years from I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the available years. The 
deflators from the more aggregated industries were used for each of the parts. 
 
Italy 
For 31-33, missing years in I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the 
available years. Detailed industries in other transport equipment (35) are not available from 
STAN for the period since 1995, so these were extrapolated using shares from I&S from then 
on. The I&S data for 1995 were interpolated. For employment in other transport equipment, 
only the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) was available for the period until 1995. The 
share in FTEs was used for 1990 to 1995. Value added in constant prices and employment for 
1990 and 1991 in textiles and wearing apparel (17-18), paper and publishing (21-22), the   50 
metal industries (27-28) and financial intermediation (65-67) were extrapolated using the data 
for the later years. This was also done for financial intermediation (65-67) for value added in 
current prices. Furthermore, real estate (70) includes rental of machinery (71) and computer 
services (72) includes research and development (73). These were split up using the 
distribution from Germany. To split up business services (74) we (arbitrarily) assumed 
professional services (741-743) makes up half of the total. 
 
Japan 
For 31-33, missing years in I &S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the 
available years. In addition, the industries in other transport equipment (35) as well as the 
division between education (80) and health (85) was extrapolated for 1998 and 1996-1998 
respectively. Repair activities (50) are included with the individual manufacturing industries 
so could not be separately distinguished. Hotels and restaurants (55) are included in social and 
personal services (90-93) and could not be separately distinguished. Similarly, financial 
intermediation (65-67) could not be split up further. Other business activities (71-74) were 
(arbitrarily) split up according to the following Table. 
 
  Value added  Employment 
a) 
71, Renting of machinery  10% of 71-74  5% of BUS 
72, Computer services  20% of 71-74  15% of BUS 
73, R&D  20% of 71-74  20% of BUS 
741-3, Professional services  30% of 71-74  60% of BUS 
749, Other business activities  20% of 71-74  (71-74) – BUS 
a) BUS is from the Labour Force Survey and calculated as finance, 
real estate and business services – real estate – finance. 
 
Netherlands 
For the Netherlands, we obtained newly revised data directly from the national accounts and 
the accompanying Input/Output tables, which are fully consistent with the national accounts. 
These I/O tables were used for a considerable number of manufacturing industries, but are not 
separately shown in Table B1 due to the consistency with the national accounts. To split up 
the industries in radio, TV and communication equipment (32), we had only one observation 
from the PPI weights, which we used for the whole decade. The I/O tables did not include the 
number persons employed, so here we used shares from the Census. 
 
Norway 
For 31-33, missing years in I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the 
available years. The same goes for trade and repairs (50-52) and other business activities (71-
74) based on SerNA. In addition to these two sources, the Structure Statistics from Statistics 
Norway for 1998 and 1999 were used. For other years, shares were assumed to have remained 
constant. Furthermore, for most manufacturing industries, data on value added in current 
prices and employment for 2000 were extrapolated based on I&S (exceptions are food, wood, 
paper and publishing, basic metals and shipbuilding). For transport and communication (60-
64) and real estate (70), data on value added in current prices and employment for 1990 was   51 
extrapolated based on SerNA. For value added in constant prices, additional extrapolations 
had to be made for chemical industries (23-26) based on the aggregate directly from the 
National Accounts. Textiles (17) and wearing apparel (18) were split up to obtain value added 
in constant prices by using their share in value added in current prices. Data on value added in 
constant prices for fabricated metal products (28) were calculated as a residual after 
subtracting basic metal (27) from the total of the two industries. For the industries in trade and 
repair (50-52) the deflator for the more aggregated industry was used. Finally, employment in 
community social and personal services (75-99) was extrapolated for 1998-2000 using trends 
from STAN for the earlier years. 
 
Spain 
For 31-33, missing years in I&S were extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the 
available years. The same goes for 50-52 based on SerNA. Business services (74) could not 
be split up any further. Industries in financial intermediation (65-67) and other business 
activities (71-74) were extrapolated for 1990-1994 and 1999 based on shares from STAN for 
the other years. The same was done for transport and communication (60-64) for 1999. Value 
added in constant prices for all manufacturing industries except food (15-16) and non-metallic 




The STAN data for Sweden currently run to 1998. We extended this to 2000 using detailed 
national accounts tables from Statistics Sweden. For 31-33, missing years in I&S were 
extrapolated using the trend in the shares for the available years. For 50-52, shares were 
assumed to have remained constant for years before 1997 and after 1998. Financial 
intermediation (65-67) and community, social and personal services (75-99) could not be split 
up further. For aggregating to the EU level, the average shares of the detailed industries for all 
other EU countries were applied. Research and development (73), professional services (741-
743) and other business services (749) were split up using their composition in Denmark. 
Employment alone had to be split up for textiles and wearing apparel (17-18) and other 
transport equipment (35) using I&S. To obtain value added in constant prices for 1990-1992 
for all manufacturing industries, shares were extrapolated using data for later years. For most 
services industries, the deflator for a more aggregated industry was used. 
 
Switzerland   
We used separate national accounts data for this country, since there is no data in STAN yet. 
For value added in current prices and employment the w eight in the PPI was used to 
distinguish fiber optics (313) from the rest of electrical machinery (31ex313) and split up 
radio, TV and communication equipment (32). In instruments and watches (33), only watches 
(335) could be distinguished separately, so i nstruments (331) includes everything but 
watches. Business services (74) could not be split up. 
   52 
United Kingdom 
At present, the data from STAN only run up to 1999. Data for 2000 were obtained directly 
from the National Acounts in the ONS Blue Book (2001). For 1999 and 2000, Table B1 
shows that the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) was used for extrapolation in a number of 
industries. For value added in constant prices, deflators for more aggregated industries were 
used. The number of self-employed is only available for broad sectors, so the share of self-
employed in the total number of persons employed is applied to all underlying industries. 
 
United States 
Since the U.S. does not use the ISIC rev 3 classification, a large number of adaptations had to 
be made, mainly in the ICT producing manufacturing industries. While the STAN database 
contained data on value added in current prices for the industries 29 up to 33, it did not 
provide a further disaggregation to 3 -digit level. For insulated wire and cable (313), 
semiconductors (321), communication equipment (322), radio and TV receivers (323), and  
medical and measurement instruments and industrial process control (331), value added 
shares were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) 
and used as weights to calculate value added in current prices.
48 For a number of 2-digit 
industries, data for 2000 were lacking in STAN (these include, amongst others 31, electrical 
machinery and 32, radio, television and communication equipment). The 1999 figures were 
extrapolated using the 2000 ASM. The procedure to obtain a complete set of employment 
figures is comparable to that used for value added in current prices. Extrapolations to 2000 
(where needed) are also based on the 2000 ASM. 
 
A number of other adjustments had to be made. First, value added and employment for 
wholesale trade, retail trade and repairs had to be separated. While these are separate 
industries in the BEA “GDP by Industry” data set, they are combined in STAN. According to 
ISIC, retail trade (52) does not include eating and drinking places, but in the U.S. SIC this 
industry (SIC 58) is included in retail trade (SIC 52-59). We used the BEA “Gross Output by 
Detailed Industry” data to relocate eating and drinking places to Hotels and restaurants (ISIC 
55). Since gross output from this source is not consistent with the GDP by Industry figures, 
we scaled the figures down to equal the GDP by Industry totals.
49 We next used value added 
from the BLS I/O tables to calculate value added in current prices. Here, too, we had to make 
an adjustment so that value added in current prices for these industries combined would sum 
to the total from the national accounts. Employment figures were obtained from the BLS. 
These are employees figures instead o f persons employed figures, and not completely 
consistent with the figures the BEA figures reported in the GDP by Industry data. We used 
                                                 
48 Here, the BEA “Shipments of Manufacturing Industries” data could not be used, since these only 
contain value of shipments figures apart from the price data. Because the concordance between NAICS 
and SIC is not perfect, the shares showed a shift between 1997 and 1998. For the deflators this is less 
of a problem than for the value added and employment data. Therefore, for 1996-97, we extrapolated 
31 and 313 as well as 33 and 331 with the growth rate of 31 and 33 respectively. For the years 1997-
2000, we applied the growth rates from the NAICS based data. 
49 The Gross Output by Detailed Industry data are based on the benchmark I/O tables (last one for 
1992) and are extrapolated for other years.   53 
employee shares to scale these up to the number of persons employed. It should be stressed 
that these adjustments for r etail trade and restaurants do matter in an important way. It 
diminishes value added (in current prices) in retail trade by around 25%, while quadrupling 
value added in hotels and restaurants. 
 
The calculation of value added (in current and constant prices) and employment for 
business services follows a similar procedure. In STAN, other business activities (ISIC 71-74) 
is equal to the industries business services (SIC 73), legal services (SIC 81) and other services 
(SIC 84, 87, 89). While this is roughly correct, there are some important exceptions, like 
automobile renting (part of ISIC 71 but included in automobile repair in the U.S.). ISIC 71-74 
in STAN also includes Museums, botanical, zoological gardens (SIC 84), which we relocated 
to ISIC 90-93 (Personal, Social and Community Services). Finally, post and 
telecommunications should not include radio and TV broadcasting (SIC 483) so we relocate 
this industry to ISIC 90-93 as well. The industries in other business activities (71-74) can now 
also be separately distinguished. 
 
The next problem was that no separate price deflators are available for the machinery 
and electrical machinery industries (29-33), the other transport equipment industries (35) or 
for the industries in which we reclassified detailed industries. We therefore developed our 
own deflators for these industries. From the BEA data sets on “Gross Output by Detailed 
Industry” and “Shipments of Manufacturing Industries” we used value of shipments deflators 
for manufacturing industries and gross output deflators for non-manufacturing industries. We 
use a Törnqvist index to obtain gross output (value of shipments) deflators for each of the 
industries. 
 
We then use the Input/Output (I/O) tables from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
50 
for 1990-2000 to calculate an intermediate input deflator for each ISIC industry. For each of 
the 190 I/O industries distinguished we calculated a gross output deflator series.
51 We use 
these deflators to calculate an intermediate input price index for each industry. For industry i 
this is done in the following way: 
 







i P s P , , ln ln   (B1) 
In equation (B1) 
M
j i P,  is the price of the j
th intermediate input used in industry i. The 
price change for this input is weighted by the average share of input j i n total intermediate 
inputs in current prices of the industry over the two periods: 
 
                                                 
50 Specifically from the Office of Occupational Statistics and Employment Projections 
(www.bls.gov/emp). We use these tables since they are available for each year in our sample and 
because the industry detail is much greater (190 versus 96 industries). 
51 If there is a  many-to-one correspondence, we use a Törnqvist index to aggregate to the level of 





















































.  (B2) 
Using the deflators for gross output and intermediate inputs, we calculate gross output 










ln D - D = D   (B3) 
Here,  i i Q V ,  and  i M  are the quantity indices of value added, gross output and 





















= - =   (B4) 
In other words, 
V
i s  is the share of current value added in current gross output. The 
average over the two periods is taken and used in equation (B3). While this procedure does 
not exactly replicate the BEA procedure, it serves as a good approximation since the 
aggregate deflators are close to the value added deflator from the national accounts.
52 Given 
these deflators, value added in constant prices all industries could be calculated.
                                                 
52 Differences exist for a number of reasons: the BEA uses the detailed source material of the I/O 
tables, which is even more disaggregated than the 532-industry detail benchmark table. Furthermore we 
use a single deflator for all inputs from a certain commodity category, while the BEA distinguishes 
between domestically produced and imported goods. Also, our price deflators correspond to the value 
of shipments of an industry not of the commodities that are used as inputs.    55 




Food & beverages 15-16
Textiles 17 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Apparel 18 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Leather 19 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Wood 20
Paper 21 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Printing & Publishing 22 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Petroleum & coal 23
Chemicals 24
Rubber & plastics 25




Office and Comp. Eq. 30
Fiber optics 31.3 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp
Semiconductors 32.1 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp
Communication eq. 32.2 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp
Instruments 33.1 I&S (91-98ex96) Cur, Emp I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp I&S (93-98) Emp I&S (95-98) Cur, Emp




Railroad and other 352+359
Misc. manufacturing 36-37 I&S (94-95) Cur, Emp
Utilities 40-41
Construction 45
Repairs 50 I&S (97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Wholesale trade 51 I&S (97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Retail trade 52 I&S (97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Hotels & restaurants 55
Transport 60-63
Telecommunications 64
Banks 65 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Insurance 66 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Securities trade 67
Real estate 70
Renting of machinery 71
Computer services 72 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp
R&D 73 Residual
Professional services 74.1-74.3 I&S (97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA (90-99)
a)
Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-97) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp




Personal & social serv. 90-93
Private households 95
a) All of 74 e) Split up using shares for Denmark
b) Arbitrarily assumed to have equal shares f) All of 33, except watches is included under 331
c) 70 includes 71, 72 includes 73. Split up based on composition in Germany g) See text for details on data used for these industries
d) See text for details on subdivision h) For these industries new deflators are calculated
Austria Canada Denmark Finland




Mining 10-14 NA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp






Printing & Publishing 22
Petroleum & coal 23 NA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Chemicals 24
Rubber & plastics 25
Stone, clay & glass 26 NA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Basic metals 27 I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp
Fabricated metals 28 I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp
Machinery 29
Office and Comp. Eq. 30
Fiber optics 31.3 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Semiconductors 32.1 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Communication eq. 32.2 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Instruments 33.1 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Watches & instruments 33-33.1 I&S (90-98) Cur, Emp I&S (95-99) Cur, Emp I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Motor vehicles 34 I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp
Ships 351 I&S (91-97) Cur, Emp I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp
Aircraft 353 I&S(92-97ex95) Cur, Emp




Repairs 50 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (91-98) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Wholesale trade 51 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (91-98) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Retail trade 52 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (91-98) Cur, Con, Emp SerNA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp






Real estate 70 c)
Renting of machinery 71 c)
Computer services 72 c)
R&D 73 c)
Professional services 74.1-74.3 SerNA (90-99) Cur, Con, Emp b) a) b)




Personal & social serv. 90-93 NA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
Private households 95 NA (92-99) Cur, Con, Emp
a) All of 74 e) Split up using shares for Denmark
b) Arbitrarily assumed to have equal shares f) All of 33, except watches is included under 331
c) 70 includes 71, 72 includes 73. Split up based on composition in Germany g) See text for details on data used for these industries
d) See text for details on subdivision h) For these industries new deflators are calculated




Food & beverages 15-16
Textiles 17 Census(93-99) Emp
Apparel 18 Census(93-99) Emp
Leather 19 Census(93-99) Emp
Wood 20 Census(93-99) Emp
Paper 21
Printing & Publishing 22
Petroleum & coal 23
Chemicals 24
Rubber & plastics 25




Office and Comp. Eq. 30 Census(93-99) Emp
Fiber optics 31.3 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp I&S(92-98) Cur, Emp I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp I&S(92-98) Cur, Emp I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Semiconductors 32.1 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp PPI(95) I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Communication eq. 32.2 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp PPI(95) I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp PPI(95) I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Instruments 33.1 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp I&S(92-98) Cur, Emp I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Watches & instruments 33-33.1 I&S(94-98) Cur, Emp I&S(92-98) Cur, Emp I&S(91-99) Cur, Emp I&S(93-98) Cur, Emp
Motor vehicles 34 Census(93-99) Emp
Ships 351 Census(93-99) Emp
Aircraft 353 Census(93-99) Emp
Railroad and other 352+359 Census(93-99) Emp
Misc. manufacturing 36-37 Census(93-99) Emp
Utilities 40-41
Construction 45
Repairs 50 Struc(98-99) Cur, Emp SerNA(95-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Wholesale trade 51 SerNA(90-98) Cur, Con, Emp Struc(98-99) Cur, Emp SerNA(95-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Retail trade 52 SerNA(90-98) Cur, Con, Emp Struc(98-99) Cur, Emp SerNA(95-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Hotels & restaurants 55
Transport 60-63
Telecommunications 64
Banks 65 SerNA(90-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Insurance 66 SerNA(90-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Securities trade 67 SerNA(90-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Real estate 70 d)
Renting of machinery 71 d) SerNA(90-97) Cur, Con, Emp
Computer services 72 d) SerNA(90-97) Cur, Con, Emp
R&D 73 d) Struc(98-99) Cur, Emp
Professional services 74.1-74.3 d) Struc(98-99) Cur, Emp a)




Personal & social serv. 90-93
Private households 95
a) All of 74 e) Split up using shares for Denmark
b) Arbitrarily assumed to have equal shares f) All of 33, except watches is included under 331
c) 70 includes 71, 72 includes 73. Split up based on composition in Germany g) See text for details on data used for these industries
d) See text for details on subdivision h) For these industries new deflators are calculated




Food & beverages 15-16
Textiles 17 I&S(91-98) Emp I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(00) Cur, Emp
Apparel 18 I&S(91-98) Emp I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(00) Cur, Emp
Leather 19 I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Wood 20
Paper 21 I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Printing & Publishing 22 I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Petroleum & coal 23
Chemicals 24
Rubber & plastics 25
Stone, clay & glass 26
Basic metals 27 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Fabricated metals 28 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Machinery 29
Office and Comp. Eq. 30 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(00) Cur, Emp h)
Fiber optics 31.3 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp PPI(93) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp PPI(93) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Semiconductors 32.1 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp PPI(93) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Communication eq. 32.2 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp PPI(93) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp PPI(93) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Instruments 33.1 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp f) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Watches & instruments 33-33.1 I&S(91-98) Cur, Emp f) I&S(93-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(90-00) Cur, Emp h)
Motor vehicles 34 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp
Ships 351 I&S(91-98) Emp ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(00) Cur, Emp h)
Aircraft 353 I&S(91-98) Emp ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp ASM(00) Cur, Emp h)




Repairs 50 I&S(97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA(92-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Con, Emp g) h)
Wholesale trade 51 I&S(97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA(92-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Con, Emp
Retail trade 52 I&S(97-98) Cur, Emp SerNA(92-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Con, Emp g) h)
Hotels & restaurants 55 g) h)
Transport 60-63





Renting of machinery 71 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp g) h)
Computer services 72 ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp g) h)
R&D 73 e) ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp g) h)
Professional services 74.1-74.3 e) a) SerNA(92-98), ABI(99-00) Cur, Emp g) h)




Personal & social serv. 90-93 g) h)
Private households 95
a) All of 74 e) Split up using shares for Denmark
b) Arbitrarily assumed to have equal shares f) All of 33, except watches is included under 331
c) 70 includes 71, 72 includes 73. Split up based on composition in Germany g) See text for details on data used for these industries
d) See text for details on subdivision h) For these industries new deflators are calculated
UK US Sweden Switzerland
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Appendix C: Contributions of industry groups and industries to productivity growth 
 
Appendix Table C1: Contribution of  industry groups to labor productivity growth, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000




Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b






Total Economy 2.30 1.62 3.38 1.00 2.15 3.03 1.81 0.66 1.62 2.84 2.89 1.88 1.07 0.79 3.34 -0.11 1.08
ICT Producers 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.24 0.34 0.89 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.54 0.33 0.14 0.50 0.13 0.08 0.51
ICT-producing manufacturing 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.82 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.30 0.17 0.12 0.39 0.05 0.03 0.40
ICT-producing services 0.15 0.27 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.11
ICT Users 0.58 0.29 0.42 0.28 0.44 0.42 0.61 0.18 -0.06 0.76 0.67 0.42 0.59 0.19 1.01 -0.51 0.43
ICT-using manufacturing 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.37 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.32 0.13 0.20 0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.01
ICT-using services 0.47 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.37 0.09 -0.14 0.44 0.54 0.23 0.51 0.29 0.95 -0.51 0.45
Non ICT 1.25 1.00 2.35 0.48 1.35 1.48 0.99 0.47 1.37 1.88 1.92 1.10 0.47 0.00 2.79 0.41 0.23
Non-ICT manufacturing 0.60 0.28 0.85 0.42 0.66 1.29 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.78 0.52 0.51 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.47 0.31
Non-ICT services 0.02 0.24 0.94 -0.13 0.40 -0.27 0.25 -0.10 0.38 0.76 0.63 0.25 -0.05 -0.08 0.29 -0.05 -0.15
Non-ICT other industries 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.19 0.29 0.45 0.36 0.14 0.52 0.34 0.76 0.34 0.25 0.03 2.34 -0.01 0.07







Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b






Total Economy 2.29 1.89 2.57 1.17 1.36 5.46 0.81 0.94 0.37 2.10 1.77 1.41 1.43 0.88 1.73 1.06 2.52
ICT Producers 0.16 0.28 0.86 0.46 0.67 2.75 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.56 0.47 0.32 0.73 0.35 -0.11 0.75
ICT-producing manufacturing 0.17 0.06 0.55 0.22 0.20 2.77 0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.61 0.04 -0.09 0.68
ICT-producing services -0.01 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.46 -0.02 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.31 -0.03 0.07
ICT Users 0.82 0.51 0.56 0.24 0.35 0.89 0.24 0.56 0.03 0.67 0.66 0.42 0.78 0.04 0.84 0.48 1.42
ICT-using manufacturing 0.34 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.56 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.24 0.05
ICT-using services 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.15 0.18 0.33 0.14 0.43 -0.01 0.57 0.56 0.29 0.73 0.00 0.90 0.24 1.37
Non ICT 1.02 1.10 0.96 0.46 0.24 1.65 0.19 0.23 0.09 1.18 0.60 0.48 0.25 -0.01 0.68 0.71 0.36
Non-ICT manufacturing 0.61 0.37 0.41 0.32 0.07 1.76 0.08 0.20 -0.04 0.44 0.04 0.18 0.19 -0.03 0.13 0.57 0.13
Non-ICT services -0.14 0.57 0.28 0.03 -0.05 -0.31 -0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.69 0.39 0.08 -0.12 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.18
Non-ICT other industries 0.55 0.15 0.27 0.11 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.18 -0.20 0.36 -0.13 0.05
Shift effect 0.29 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.09 0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.01
Notes: contributions of industry groups refer to the "intra-effect" only, that is the weighted average productivity growth of the group (see text). The "shift-effect", which
refers to the effect of reallocations between groups on aggregate productivity growth, is reported separately.
a) 1991-1995; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98; d) excluding ICT-producing industries  
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Appendix Table C2: Contribution of industries to productivity growth
in the EU and the U.S. for 1995-2000
EU US Difference
Total Economy 1.40 2.49 1.09
Total ICT-producing manufacturing 0.25 0.73 0.48
30 Office and Comp. Eq. 0.14 0.24 0.10
313 Fiber optics 0.00 0.00 0.00
321 Semiconductors 0.14 0.50 0.36
322 Communication eq. 0.02 0.02 0.00
323 Radio and TV eq. -0.02 0.00 0.01
331 Instruments -0.03 -0.03 0.00
Total ICT-producing services 0.35 0.26 -0.09
64 Telecommunications 0.20 0.16 -0.04
72 Computer services 0.14 0.09 -0.05
Total ICT-using manufacturing 0.01 -0.08 -0.09
18 Apparel -0.01 -0.02 0.00
22 Printing & Publishing 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
29 Machinery 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
31-31.3 Electrical machinery 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
33-33.1 Watches & instruments 0.00 0.00 -0.01
35.1 Ships 0.00 0.00 -0.01
35.3 Aircraft 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
35.2+35.9 Railroad and other 0.00 0.00 0.00
36-37 Misc. manufacturing 0.00 0.01 0.01
Total ICT-using services 0.41 1.30 0.89
51 Wholesale trade 0.07 0.30 0.23
52 Retail trade 0.06 0.38 0.32
65 Banks 0.06 0.10 0.04
66 Insurance -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
67 Securities trade 0.02 0.37 0.35
71 Renting of machinery 0.03 0.04 0.01
73 R&D 0.00 0.01 0.01
74.1-74.3 Professional services 0.16 0.11 -0.05
Total Non-ICT manufacturing 0.04 -0.05 -0.09
15-16 Food products -0.02 -0.09 -0.07
17 Textiles -0.01 -0.01 0.00
19 Leather -0.01 0.00 0.00
20 Wood products 0.00 0.00 -0.01
21 Paper products 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
23 Petroleum & coke -0.01 0.00 0.01
24 Chemicals 0.05 0.04 -0.01
25 Rubber and plastics 0.01 0.02 0.00
26 Stone, clay & glass 0.00 0.01 0.01
27 Basic metals -0.01 0.01 0.02
28 Fabricated metal products 0.01 0.00 -0.01
34 Motor vehicles 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Total Non-ICT services 0.38 0.23 -0.14
50 Repairs 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
55 Hotels & restaurants 0.02 0.01 -0.01
60-63 Transportation 0.09 0.07 -0.02
70 Real estate 0.05 0.14 0.09
74.9 Other business services 0.12 0.14 0.02
75 Government -0.03 -0.09 -0.06
80 Education -0.01 0.00 0.01
85 Health 0.05 -0.01 -0.06
90-93 Personal & social services 0.05 -0.01 -0.06
Total Non-ICT other industries -0.03 0.10 0.13
01-05 Agriculture 0.01 0.06 0.05
10-14 Mining -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
40-41 Utilities 0.02 -0.02 -0.04
45 Construction -0.05 0.11 0.16
Notes: these contributions include both the intra-effect 
 and the shift-effect from equation (2)    62 
Appendix D: Productivity growth by industry and country 
 
Appendix Table D1: Labor productivity growth (value added per person engaged) by individual industry, 1990-1995
Austria Denmark Finland France
b Germany
a Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b Sweden UK EU Canada
b Japan
c Norway Switzer- US
1990-1995 lands land
Total Economy 2.3 1.6 3.3 1.0 2.1 3.0 1.8 0.7 1.6 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.1 0.8 3.3 -0.1 1.1
Total ICT-producing manufacturing 7.6 6.5 8.9 10.0 6.8 17.1 4.6 5.7 8.3 -0.7 15.8 11.1 11.8 12.4 8.4 1.4 15.1
Office and Comp. Eq. 30 24.2 24.3 11.0 26.2 26.8 29.1 28.7 34.2 28.4 25.2 33.8 33.2 16.6 26.9 33.7 27.8 28.6
Fiber optics 31.3 4.5 11.8 9.2 5.0 6.5 13.6 6.3 10.5 11.1 18.3 -0.3 6.9 4.9 13.3 7.1 2.6 5.6
Semiconductors 32.1 24.7 28.9 22.8 32.3 41.9 32.0 33.4 31.0 26.5 19.0 36.1 37.7 29.7 23.5 33.5 31.5 36.8
Communication eq. 32.2 5.1 2.4 9.8 3.2 11.3 0.5 -4.1 4.4 -3.2 -3.6 13.0 5.0 6.2 2.0 10.5 4.9 6.6
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 1.6 -0.8 -1.3 -5.0 -10.9 -12.6 4.9 1.2 -3.1 -13.7 7.4 -2.6 13.5 -2.2 1.1 1.7 -4.6
Instruments 33.1 -3.1 1.3 -0.4 -4.0 -2.7 -10.9 -5.6 -1.8 -3.7 -17.2 -1.7 -2.6 -3.0 -6.9 -0.5 -2.2 -4.5
Total ICT-producing services 4.8 7.9 4.8 2.6 5.9 2.2 1.6 2.3 3.1 6.8 5.6 4.4 0.4 4.2 2.1 1.5 3.1
Telecommunications 64 5.8 5.1 6.6 2.5 7.7 4.8 4.4 4.0 4.0 8.0 6.2 5.7 2.1 4.7 2.3 3.2 3.3
Computer services 72 1.3 12.3 0.0 2.8 0.5 -3.5 -3.4 -1.6 0.9 3.3 5.3 1.5 1.6 3.7 1.5 -3.3 2.7
Total ICT-using manufacturing 1.9 2.7 4.7 3.3 2.6 6.1 3.4 1.8 1.7 5.6 2.1 3.1 2.1 -1.1 1.3 0.0 -0.3
Apparel 18 2.8 3.2 2.0 3.2 3.6 -6.6 8.0 1.3 4.1 5.8 3.6 5.2 4.1 -5.9 1.8 -10.5 3.4
Printing & Publishing 22 -0.7 -0.7 3.7 1.5 2.7 6.4 0.2 1.9 -1.1 8.2 0.2 1.9 -0.8 -2.5 1.3 -3.1 -2.6
Machinery 29 1.9 2.6 4.4 5.3 4.6 7.5 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.6 4.2 2.7 -1.8 0.8 1.6 0.9
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 4.5 11.8 9.2 5.0 6.5 13.6 6.3 10.5 11.1 18.3 -0.3 6.9 4.9 13.3 7.1 2.6 5.6
Watches & instruments 33-33.1 5.4 9.7 7.9 6.3 4.2 2.2 2.9 4.4 4.7 14.0 23.1 7.5 4.2 1.5 -2.8 1.4 2.1
Ships 351 7.8 10.6 8.9 0.7 -1.2 -5.5 2.6 0.0 3.1 -4.2 10.7 4.1 5.8 14.6 0.2 -13.5 -3.8
Aircraft 353 4.0 6.5 -8.1 -5.8 -1.5 -3.0 -2.5 1.3 0.5 -0.1 4.7 8.3 -1.0
Railroad and other 352+359 7.8 0.6 -7.4 8.0 0.7 -6.8 8.7 1.6 7.9 -2.2 2.7 5.9 10.1 5.8 6.5 -2.0
Misc. manufacturing 36-37 -0.3 0.8 3.1 0.9 -0.7 6.0 3.9 0.2 0.1 5.6 -0.9 1.1 4.7 -2.6 -2.1 4.1 1.3
Total ICT-using services 2.1 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.6 0.4 -0.7 2.5 2.5 1.1 1.9 1.4 5.2 -2.0 1.9
Wholesale trade 51 0.7 2.6 -1.9 2.9 3.1 -0.6 4.1 -0.4 0.7 3.8 4.9 2.9 3.7 2.0
f) 5.3 -6.0 3.4
Retail trade 52 0.7 2.6 4.3 1.3 0.2 -0.6 0.7 0.1 1.6 3.8 2.6 1.1 1.1 0.0 5.3 2.9 2.3
Banks 65 5.3 -1.1 -0.3 -2.1 1.4 4.8 0.6 4.3 -2.9 3.1
d) 2.2 0.4 2.3 0.0
d) 5.1 -0.9 1.3
Insurance 66 -0.4 -6.5 -3.5 0.3 3.0 4.8 3.3 0.8 -11.9 1.4 0.2 2.5 8.8 4.1 3.0
Securities trade 67 -3.1 1.9 7.0 3.4 -2.2 4.8 1.6 -0.7 1.0 0.9 1.1 9.8 -10.2 3.2
Renting of machinery 71 5.9 0.4 -0.3 0.7 -3.5 0.0 -3.8 1.1 -6.3 5.5 2.4 3.7 8.6 -5.0 6.7
R&D 73 13.6 -2.5 0.1 -0.1 0.5 -3.5 -1.4 -3.8 -1.7 -0.6 2.3 -0.2 1.1 3.7 5.3 -4.8 1.0
Professional services 74.1-74.3 1.6 -2.0 3.7 -0.9 -2.2 -3.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.6 2.1 -0.4 -0.3 3.7 5.3 -5.4 -0.7  
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Appendix Table D1 (cont.)
Austria Denmark Finland France
b Germany
a Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b Sweden UK EU Canada
b Japan
c Norway Switzer- US
1990-1995 lands land
Total Non-ICT manufacturing 4.6 2.9 6.2 3.4 4.4 7.8 2.7 3.7 3.5 6.3 4.0 3.8 2.1 0.4 2.2 4.4 3.0
Food & beverages 15-16 3.7 3.1 5.9 2.2 3.6 3.9 2.1 6.1 1.2 6.5 3.1 2.9 1.4 -1.7 3.3 4.1 3.5
Textiles 17 0.5 2.8 8.6 5.4 4.3 2.1 1.3 1.4 4.1 4.8 2.5 3.5 3.0 0.6 1.7 5.8 3.0
Leather 19 1.4 1.7 3.6 1.5 8.3 -4.5 3.8 2.1 2.1 4.7 0.1 3.3 2.8 -2.7 8.3 -0.2 4.9
Wood 20 1.2 4.5 5.5 2.9 5.7 0.5 3.0 1.3 2.2 1.1 0.8 2.5 -2.0 -2.7 -2.9 1.1 -2.8
Paper 21 8.3 5.8 7.6 1.2 0.6 1.5 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.8 3.8 3.5 -0.8 -2.6 3.7 1.1 0.0
Petroleum & coal 23 51.5 -18.9 5.9 15.7 -1.6 17.1 5.7 4.0 5.2 11.9 8.6 9.6 4.0 -3.0 -15.9 -22.3 5.0
Chemicals 24 3.4 5.2 4.4 5.9 8.3 10.5 3.5 5.3 3.9 6.7 7.6 6.8 3.6 2.4 1.9 11.5 3.4
Rubber & plastics 25 4.9 -3.7 3.2 4.3 3.2 5.9 2.2 1.5 3.1 6.3 2.4 3.2 3.6 0.8 0.7 -0.6 4.6
Stone, clay & glass 26 -0.7 1.7 3.9 0.1 6.7 6.9 1.4 -0.4 2.8 2.0 4.3 2.5 0.0 0.1 4.6 -1.1 2.8
Basic metals 27 3.9 4.9 7.9 3.9 10.6 -5.0 4.3 2.7 7.5 9.1 4.5 6.9 3.8 1.7 -3.8 3.5 3.9
Fabricated metals 28 4.4 3.4 4.9 1.3 1.8 0.5 4.3 2.0 2.1 6.1 0.9 2.2 2.0 2.2 12.2 -0.6 3.2
Motor vehicles 34 7.9 -3.3 0.7 2.8 2.4 -3.6 0.1 5.8 8.1 8.8 3.1 3.2 5.0 -1.3 8.9 -10.1 4.9
Total Non-ICT services 0.1 0.5 2.0 -0.3 0.9 -0.9 0.6 -0.2 0.9 1.5 1.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.4
Repairs 50 0.7 -20.2 4.0 -1.9 -3.1 -0.6 5.4 -0.7 -0.4 3.8 1.4 -0.1 5.3 -1.4 -1.4
Hotels & restaurants 55 -1.0 2.1 3.1 -4.6 -5.2 -1.5 -1.4 -3.8 0.6 1.5 -0.6 -1.8 0.1 0.9 -5.8 -1.1
Transport 60-63 -0.3 2.3 4.0 0.8 4.9 4.8 5.5 0.8 3.2 -0.3 3.6 3.2 1.4 -2.1 4.0 -3.3 2.1
Real estate 70 -0.4 1.6 6.9 1.4 -3.3 -3.5 0.0 -1.8 5.1 6.3 -5.0 -0.7 1.1 -3.3 6.2 1.6
Other business services 74.9 1.6 1.5 -0.2 -1.7 -2.2 -2.2 2.0 -0.6 2.7 -1.1 10.1 5.3 -1.0
Government 75 1.2 1.8 -0.2 1.2 2.2 0.7 2.5 0.9 1.2 0.9
e)
-0.1 1.4 1.3 0.4 2.0 2.7 0.0
Education 80 -1.4 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 -3.7 0.0 1.2 0.7 2.6 0.9 -1.4 1.2 0.4 -7.5 -0.2
Health 85 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.5 1.6 -1.3 -1.4 -0.7 1.6 2.9 0.8 -0.6 1.4 0.0 -1.0 -2.2
Personal & social serv. 90-93 -0.2 1.3 0.0 -3.0 -1.1 -2.4 -0.7 -0.4 -1.3 3.7 -0.4 -1.5 -1.6 0.5 -0.6 0.3
Private households 95 1.3 -0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -1.4 -0.4   0.8 2.2
Extra-terr. org. 99
Total Non-ICT other industries 4.5 4.1 4.2 1.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 0.9 2.9 2.8 6.1 2.7 1.4 0.2 9.3 -0.2 0.7
Agriculture 01-05 6.8 7.2 5.1 4.4 10.1 3.9 7.1 3.3 1.8 2.0 2.1 5.2 0.6 0.4 7.5 -0.8 -1.0
Mining 10-14 -1.2 8.1 5.4 -36.7 10.4 8.4 5.8 1.5 9.3 4.4 23.6 7.5 3.8 -0.9 8.2 -2.1 5.4
Utilities 40-41 2.0 5.5 7.2 2.2 4.0 5.6 2.8 3.1 1.6 2.5 9.8 4.5 1.1 0.7 1.7 6.1 2.5
Construction 45 2.0 -0.4 0.8 0.9 -1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -1.5 1.9 2.6 3.3 0.4 -1.4 -1.9 4.9 -2.3 0.5
a) 1991-1995; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98
d) Refers to total finance (65-67); e) Refers to total non-market services (75-99) f) Refers to Trade (50-52) as a whole    64 
Appendix Table D2: Labor productivity growth (value added per person engaged) by individual industry, 1995-2000
Austria Denmark Finland France
b Germany
a Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b Sweden UK EU Canada
b Japan
c Norway Switzer- US
1995-2000 lands land
Total Economy 2.3 1.9 2.5 1.2 1.3 5.3 0.8 0.9 0.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.5
Total ICT-producing manufacturing 9.6 5.7 13.2 15.0 13.7 42.3 6.0 -1.9 13.1 1.1 16.1 13.8 16.9 19.5 4.9 -4.3 23.7
Office and Comp. Eq. 30 87.4 54.4 -0.1 45.7 54.8 49.1 41.0 45.2 50.7 57.2 45.7 49.3 46.2 54.7 50.9 57.4 52.3
Fiber optics 31.3 7.5 3.6 4.8 3.5 7.0 -3.0 -0.4 -4.0 -3.3 5.4 1.6 2.9 12.8 3.4 -13.5 10.7 5.7
Semiconductors 32.1 47.0 56.2 52.6 53.9 66.3 82.0 53.5 53.6 48.0 40.9 55.2 56.4 56.0 47.7 56.1 48.7 52.1
Communication eq. 32.2 3.3 0.6 10.5 0.4 10.9 -12.3 -6.1 -2.0 -10.2 -4.8 3.3 3.5 0.7 -3.1 6.1 -6.9 -0.4
Radio and TV eq. 32.3 -12.1 -9.7 -7.7 -12.8 -18.6 -12.4 -11.9 -12.3 -16.0 -13.4 -13.2 -13.9 -10.5 -15.7 -20.3 -17.2 -12.5
Instruments 33.1 -4.5 -5.4 -6.3 -8.6 -3.2 -1.1 -9.6 -10.5 -6.7 -5.5 -11.8 -7.2 -4.9 -7.7 -6.7 -9.0 -5.9
Total ICT-producing services -0.4 5.9 8.1 6.2 11.9 -0.2 6.2 4.5 4.1 3.3 5.2 6.5 2.8 4.0 9.2 -0.7 1.8
Telecommunications 64 3.6 6.6 13.5 9.8 16.3 -0.6 8.6 7.7 6.2 5.6 9.1 9.9 6.9 6.8 13.8 1.1 6.5
Computer services 72 -9.8 5.4 -1.3 0.4 4.9 -2.1 3.9 1.1 0.3 -0.6 0.3 1.5 1.1 0.7 -1.9 -3.6 -4.5
Total ICT-using manufacturing 6.0 0.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 8.7 1.5 2.7 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.1 0.5 -1.3 3.3 1.2
Apparel 18 5.4 11.2 -0.1 4.4 6.1 2.2 2.2 3.9 0.7 -1.1 3.7 2.9 0.9 -0.8 0.4 6.6 3.8
Printing & Publishing 22 7.4 -1.3 2.6 0.7 2.5 8.0 1.9 4.3 0.9 3.8 1.2 2.5 -1.4 1.6 -3.8 3.6 -0.2
Machinery 29 5.3 1.2 0.7 2.5 0.9 -3.1 0.4 2.2 1.3 0.6 -1.4 1.0 -5.4 -1.2 -0.5 2.3 0.3
Electrical machinery 31-31.3 7.5 3.6 4.8 3.5 7.0 -3.0 -0.4 -4.0 -3.3 5.4 1.6 2.9 12.8 3.4 -13.5 10.7 5.7
Watches & instruments 33-33.1 7.6 5.0 1.1 3.1 5.8 13.3 3.6 4.3 3.8 3.8 2.0 5.1 5.6 7.1 5.7 5.8 14.2
Ships 351 -1.1 -15.7 -2.7 15.3 -0.8 2.4 2.8 -0.5 -1.0 -2.7 -8.1 0.4 7.7 0.1 0.8 -12.3 -0.2
Aircraft 353 1.6 -9.7 9.9 1.9 11.0 6.1 -4.9 18.8 6.4 6.3 -2.3 11.8 1.1
Railroad and other 352+359 -1.1 0.5 3.6 -0.4 6.6 14.7 1.3 25.9 7.4 4.2 -6.0 3.1 -13.4 -11.0 -1.4 -0.1
Misc. manufacturing 36-37 3.7 0.2 2.5 2.9 0.9 -1.3 3.0 0.3 0.8 4.6 -0.9 1.5 4.9 2.9 -2.6 2.5 2.4
Total ICT-using services 2.1 2.5 3.0 0.7 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.9 -0.1 3.3 2.6 1.4 2.8 0.0 4.8 0.8 5.4
Wholesale trade 51 2.2 0.3 2.1 1.6 -0.3 6.2 -0.2 4.2 0.3 3.6 0.4 1.2 2.9 0.2
f) 6.1 -2.3 6.1
Retail trade 52 2.7 0.8 1.6 0.9 -0.2 6.2 0.6 0.8 1.4 3.0 3.5 1.4 2.9 -2.7 6.3 0.0 6.9
Banks 65 4.4 5.2 11.9 -1.3 8.3 -1.9 4.9 -0.1 0.1 5.4
d) 1.3 3.0 3.7 1.7
d) 7.0 5.0 2.8
Insurance 66 4.1 8.9 0.4 -0.8 -9.4 -1.9 -3.2 -2.3 -11.0 3.6 0.2 4.8 4.8 0.8 -1.0
Securities trade 67 -5.9 -13.3 16.5 1.1 1.0 -1.9 -2.7 2.4 5.1 6.5 2.0 12.9 4.3 15.3
Renting of machinery 71 0.8 -1.9 2.0 -1.0 2.5 -2.1 -0.6 3.1 0.5 7.4 0.8 0.5 0.7 5.4 0.2 5.7
R&D 73 -2.2 4.1 -0.8 -1.2 6.3 -2.1 3.9 -3.2 -3.0 -0.4 -5.8 -0.5 0.4 0.7 -1.8 -7.1 3.1
Professional services 74.1-74.3 -2.2 5.8 -0.2 2.3 -3.4 -2.1 -1.4 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 4.6 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.6 -2.3 1.0    65 
Appendix Table D2 (cont.)
Austria Denmark Finland France
b Germany
a Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
b Sweden UK EU Canada
b Japan
c Norway Switzer- US
1995-2000 lands land
Total Non-ICT manufacturing 4.6 3.8 3.0 2.7 0.5 10.4 0.6 2.0 -0.3 3.3 0.5 1.5 1.3 -0.3 1.7 4.4 1.4
Food & beverages 15-16 2.4 0.8 3.0 -1.8 0.3 2.4 0.7 1.4 -0.2 1.8 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 0.4 -1.9 -0.7 -4.5
Textiles 17 5.4 7.0 2.1 0.8 1.6 -3.9 1.5 6.4 -0.6 3.9 0.3 1.4 0.9 -4.7 0.2 2.5 3.3
Leather 19 5.8 11.4 2.4 0.6 2.8 -2.3 -0.9 4.8 0.5 2.5 12.0 0.7 0.9 -1.0 -0.9 1.1 1.3
Wood 20 5.4 0.0 5.5 1.9 2.3 6.5 3.5 1.8 0.9 6.3 -1.7 2.7 -0.5 -6.7 4.3 1.7 0.3
Paper 21 5.1 3.0 4.3 5.8 5.4 1.1 0.1 3.2 -3.1 4.6 -2.3 2.3 -1.4 1.4 5.7 2.3 0.2
Petroleum & coal 23 16.9 19.0 -0.3 2.7 11.9 25.7 -13.1 -3.2 0.2 3.6 0.2 0.2 4.4 4.0 9.0 16.6 1.5
Chemicals 24 5.6 11.2 4.7 4.8 2.6 17.0 1.6 3.9 0.6 5.3 3.7 4.7 1.8 2.3 4.3 9.6 4.4
Rubber & plastics 25 7.2 8.8 0.0 3.1 1.3 -3.3 0.1 3.2 0.8 2.2 -0.2 1.6 3.3 -0.8 -3.3 0.0 4.1
Stone, clay & glass 26 4.4 -0.2 2.1 4.2 0.9 3.9 1.0 2.7 0.7 -0.8 -0.2 1.4 6.1 -0.1 -2.7 2.1 2.6
Basic metals 27 8.8 1.6 4.3 0.6 2.7 -3.8 -1.7 2.7 -3.4 3.2 -1.6 0.9 1.4 -0.6 3.9 1.8 3.1
Fabricated metals 28 2.1 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.0 -4.8 0.6 0.6 -0.8 0.7 1.9 0.9 0.8 -2.2 8.8 1.8 0.6
Motor vehicles 34 0.3 5.4 5.5 12.0 -5.2 6.2 3.4 2.9 1.2 4.5 -1.8 0.9 3.7 -4.4 -1.0 0.9 1.4
Total Non-ICT services -0.4 1.2 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -1.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 -0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.4
Repairs 50 2.2 20.7 1.4 -3.2 0.2 6.2 0.5 1.6 -1.1 2.2 3.1 1.0 5.1 1.4 -2.5
Hotels & restaurants 55 0.5 -1.3 -0.6 -0.4 -5.2 4.2 0.1 0.8 -0.6 2.5 -2.1 -1.2 0.6 2.4 0.9 0.4
Transport 60-63 2.5 3.3 2.2 3.0 3.1 -0.6 -1.8 1.8 0.8 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.5 -0.7 0.7 2.5 1.6
Real estate 70 -1.6 0.1 0.7 -0.5 -2.7 -2.1 -0.6 -0.4 -6.4 3.0 1.1 -0.8 1.7 -0.3 1.5 1.7
Other business services 74.9 -2.4 2.7 -2.0 -1.3 -3.4 -1.5 0.7 -0.4 5.9 -0.3 13.8 2.3 1.4
Government 75 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 -0.8 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.9
e) 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.0 0.3 0.2
Education 80 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 0.0 -5.8 -0.6 0.3 0.4 -1.0 -0.1 -1.6 1.9 1.5 -3.7 -1.2
Health 85 -3.5 0.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 -1.8 0.6 -1.2 -0.2 2.6 0.4 -0.8 0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.3
Personal & social serv. 90-93 -1.0 0.8 0.6 -2.5 -0.4 -1.1 0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -1.1 2.1 -1.3 -0.9
Private households 95 -3.1 1.3 -0.9 -2.7 -0.3 17.0 -0.5 3.2   -1.7 0.7
Extra-terr. org. 99
Total Non-ICT other industries 4.0 1.2 2.3 1.1 2.3 1.2 2.5 0.0 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.9 1.1 -1.5 1.4 -1.3 0.6
Agriculture 01-05 3.9 5.0 4.5 4.8 5.2 2.9 4.8 2.2 3.4 1.8 1.9 4.0 4.1 0.1 2.4 -4.0 6.3
Mining 10-14 4.3 8.8 -3.3 -5.9 -3.6 -0.7 -0.4 1.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 3.5 -0.5 5.0 2.9 4.0 -1.8
Utilities 40-41 5.0 -0.5 4.7 4.6 5.8 7.4 3.8 2.5 6.0 -0.4 6.4 4.9 1.6 4.1 6.0 1.0 2.3
Construction 45 2.4 -1.4 0.0 -2.7 1.0 -1.4 0.5 -0.3 -1.1 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.9 -4.2 -3.9 -0.7 0.2
a) 1991-1995; b) 1995-99; c) 1995-98
d) Refers to total finance (65-67); e) Refers to total non-market services (75-99) f) Refers to Trade (50-52) as a whole  67 
Appendix E: Decomposing the U.S-EU Productivity Growth Differential 
 
As we show in the main text, shift-share analysis can be used to trace aggregate labor 
productivity growth to individual industries within countries, but also to compare the industry 
contribution to the difference in aggregate productivity growth across countries. Of course 
this can be simply done by comparing the total percentage-point contributions of an industry 
to the aggregate. For example, between 1995 and 2000 the retail industry in the United States 
contributed 0.38 percentage point to the aggregate average annual labor productivity growth 
of 2.5 per cent. In the European Union the contribution was only 0.06 percentage point out of 
1.4 per cent aggregate labor productivity growth over the same period. One may also break 
the aggregate U.S-EU productivity growth differential down into the following four 
components: 
•  A difference due to faster (or slower) productivity growth in any given industry in the 
U.S. compared to the EU 
•  A difference due to a higher (or lower) productivity level in the U.S. than in the EU 
relative to the aggregate productivity level 
•  A difference due to a faster rise (or a slower fall) of the employment share of any given 
industry in the U.S. compared to the EU  
•  A difference due to a bigger (or smaller) employment share of any given industry in in the 
U.S. compared to the EU 
To carry out this decomposition, we start with the basic shift-share analysis as described 
in the main text. Equations (E1a) and (E1b) replicate equation (2) from the main text and add 
country subscripts A and B respectively. Aggregate productivity growth in country A can be 
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The first term o n the right-hand side of each equation, the “intra-effect”, shows the 
contribution of an industry due to its own growth in productivity, weighted by its average 
employment share over the two periods 0 and T. The second term, the “shift-effect” shows the 
contribution due to a change in the relative size of the industry, weighted by the average 
productivity level.  
If we want to compare the difference in industry contributions to the aggregate 
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Equation (E2) shows that the difference in aggregate productivity growth is due to the 
different contributions of the intra-effect of each industry and different contributions of the 
shift-effect. We can take this decomposition one step further and split the difference in intra-  68 
effect and shift-effect into effects which are related to productivity growth (DP) or levels ( P) 
and effects which are related to the employment share (S) or the change in share of 
employment (DS) by industry. More precisely, if the intra-effect of industry i in country A is 
larger than in B, this can be due to a higher productivity growth or due to a larger 
employment share over the two periods. Likewise, if the shift-effect of industry i in country A 
is larger than in B, this can be due to a bigger change in the employment share or due to a 
higher productivity level relative to the aggregate productivity level. To separate these 
different causes, we define two counterfactual shift-share equations by imposing the 
employment structure of country A on country B and vice-versa. If we impose country B’s 
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With the first counterfactual (imposing country B’s employment shares on country A) the 
decomposition is carried out as follows: 
•  The difference between the first term of (E3a) and the first term of (E1b) shows the 
difference in contribution of industry i to aggregate productivity growth because of a 
faster (or slower) productivity growth in country A compared to country B, i.e. the 
“productivity growth effect” (DP) 
•  The difference between the first term of (E3a) and the first term of (E1a) shows the 
difference in contribution of industry i to aggregate productivity growth because of a 
higher (or lower) employment share of industry i in country A compared to country B, i.e. 
the “employment share effect” (S). 
•  The difference between the second term of (E3a) and the second term of (E1a) reflects the 
difference in contribution of industry i to aggregate productivity growth because of a 
higher (or lower) productivity level in country A compared to country B relative to the 
aggregate productivity level, i.e the “productivity level effect” (P). 
•  The difference between the second term of (E3a) and the second term of (E1b) reflects the 
difference in contribution of industry i to aggregate productivity growth  because of a 
faster rise (or slower fall) in the employment share of industry i in country A compared to 
country B, i.e. the “change in employment share effect” (DS). 
Alternatively we can also impose country A’s employment structure on country B, which 
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This second counterfactual results in the same four effects described above, but will 
obviously give a different result because we now assume country A’s employment structure 
instead of that of country B. As there is no a priori reason to prefer one or the other   69 
employment structure for the counterfactual, we take a simple unweighted average of each of 
the four effects based on country A’s or country B’s structure. 
To gain a fuller understanding o f the procedure, we show an example of this 
decomposition for the case of the computer industry (ISIC 30). For the period 1995-2000, 
productivity growth in this industry was 49.3% on average per year in the EU, compared to 
52.3% in the U.S. On average the industry employed 0.14% of total employment in the EU 
and 0.18% in the United States, but between 1995 and 2000 the employment share went down 
by 0.03% in the EU and by 0.05% in the U.S.. To trace the effects of these differences on the 
industry’s contribution to aggregate productivity growth differential between the U.S. and the 
EU we run the counterfactuals as in equations (E3a) and (E3b). Looking at the intra-effect 
(the first term in each equation), this leads to the following matrix: 
 
Table E.1, Intra-effects for the computer industry (ISIC 30) in the U.S. and the EU 
with different employment structure, 1995-2000 (%-point contributions) 
Intra-effect U.S. EU Difference due to different
 productivity growth
U.S. shares 0.274 0.207 0.066
EU shares 0.199 0.154 0.045
Difference due to different
  employment structure 0.075 0.053  
 
Table E.1 shows the intra-effects for both countries under both sets of employment 
shares as well as the differences between the U.S. and EU. Taking the U.S. as country A (and 
the EU as “country” B), this means that the computer industry in the U.S. has an intra-effect 
contribution to productivity growth of 0.274 percentage-point (according to the first term of 
equation E1a), which would have been 0.199 % in case the U.S. had the same employment 
structure as the European Union (according to the first term of equation E3a). Hence the U.S.-
EU productivity differential is 0.074 percentage points due to a bigger share of the U.S. 
computer industry in total employment (S). However, this difference would have been 0.053 
percentage points had we looked at the EU intra-effects, as is shown in the second column of 
Table E.1 (comparing the first terms of equations E1b and E3b). If we compare across the 
columns instead of across the rows in Table E.1, we find that the contribution to the U.S.-EU 
productivity growth differential due to faster productivity growth in the U.S. computer 
industry (DP) is 0.066 percentage points when imposing the U.S. employment structure on 
both the U.S. and the EU (comparing the first terms of equations E1a and E3b). It becomes 
0.044 when assuming the EU employment structure for both the U.S. and the EU (comparing 
the first terms of equations E1b and E3a). 
 
Overall the intra-effect contributed 0.120 percentage points (0.274-0.154) to the 
aggregate U.S.-EU productivity differential. A straightforward way to calculate the average 
productivity growth effect is then to take an unweighted average of the two figures in the right 
column of Table E1 which comes to 0.056%. The remainder of the difference in intra-effect is 
then due to differences in size. This is equal to the average of the figures in the row   70 
“Difference due to different employment shares” or 0.064%. Together, these two effects 
exactly add up to the total difference in intra-effect of 0.120%-points. 
 
We can run a similar analysis which focuses on the second terms of equations (E1a), 
(E1b) and (E3a) and (E3b). The four possible comparisons between these second terms lead 
to another matrix (Table E.2), that results in contributions to the productivity growth 
differential because of differences in productivity levels ( P) or because of differences in the 
change in employment shares (DS). 
 
Table E.2, Shift-effects for the computer industry (ISIC rev. 30) in the U.S and the 
EU with different employment structure, 1995-2000 (%-point contributions) 
Shift-effect U.S. EU Difference due to different
 productivity levels
U.S. shares -0.029 -0.022 -0.007
EU shares -0.017 -0.013 -0.004
Difference due to different change
 in employment structure -0.011 -0.008  
 
Table E.2 shows that in the case of the computer industry the shift-effects are always 
negative. This is a consequence of the declining employment share of the computer industry 
in both Europe and the United States in combination with a strongly positive productivity 
growth rate. The bottom row and right hand columns in the Table furthermore show that the 
U.S. shift-effect is more strongly negative due to both a larger decline in employment share in 
the U.S. ( –0.011 and  –0.008) and a higher productivity level relative to the aggregate 
productivity level for the U.S. economy (–0.007 and –0.004).
53 In Table E.3 we summarize 
the results from Tables E.1 and E.2 for the computer industry, and we add similar 
computations for the semiconductor industry (ISIC 321) and retail trade (ISIC 52). 
 
Table E.3, Decomposition of the differe nce in contribution to productivity growth 
differential between the U.S. and the EU and U.S. for several industries, 1995-2000 
Computer Semiconductors Retail
(ISIC 30) (ISIC 321) ISIC (52)
U.S. 0.245 0.505 0.377
EU 0.141 0.144 0.061 -
Difference 0.104 0.361 0.317
due to different
Productivity growth 0.056 0.132 0.282
Employment shares 0.064 0.212 0.054
Productivity levels -0.006 -0.001 0.000
Change in shares -0.010 0.018 -0.019  
                                                 
53 The higher productivity level relative to the aggregate productivity level gives a larger weight to the 
decline in employment share.   71 
Table E.3 shows how semiconductors and retail trade make a very large contribution to 
the productivity growth differential between the U.S. and the EU. For retail trade, this 
difference is dominated by the much faster productivity growth in the U.S. compared to the 
EU. There is a small offsetting effect from changes in employment shares, which negatively 
contributed to the U.S.-EU aggregate productivity growth differential. The employment share 
of the industry decreased in the U.S., while it slightly increased in the EU, leading to a 
negative contribution from the change in shares. The higher productivity level of the industry 
compared to the aggregate in the U.S. (61% of the aggregate in the U.S. versus 55% in the 
EU) also led to a slightly negative contribution because of the larger change in employment 
share in the U.S.
54  
 
For the other two industries (semiconductors and computers), larger employment shares 
in the U.S. were equally (in the case of computers) or even more (in the case of 
semiconductors) important for the U.S.-EU productivity differential as the faster productivity 
growth in the U.S.. In contrast to retail and computers, changes in employment shares in 
semiconductors contributed positively to U.S.-EU productivity growth differential because 
the employment share of the industry increased in the U.S., while it decreased in the EU. 
 
Finally, in Table E.4 we show the top 5 and the bottom 5 industries in terms of 
contributions to the U.S.-EU productivity differential. This Table replicates some of the 
findings from the main text, but adds some new insights. If we look at the top 5 industries that 
were the largest contributors to the U.S-EU growth differential, it becomes clear that much 
faster productivity growth in the U.S. is the most important reason for their higher 
contributions. Only in semiconductors is the employment share effect the dominant factor. 
Securities and retail also have bigger productivity contributions in the U.S. due to their larger 
size, but this is much less important for both. Construction is the fifth industry in this top 
group because its employment share expanded from 5.1 to 5.8 percent of total employment in 
the U.S., while it decreased in the EU from 5.9 to 5.5 percent. 
 
The bottom 5 industries, or (in other words) those industries that most strongly offset the 
overall widening of the U.S.-EU productivity growth gap, show a very different picture in 
terms of contributions from the four different effects. First of all, higher productivity growth 
in the EU compared to the U.S. seems to have been relatively unimportant. In the case of food 
products, it is mainly the negative productivity growth rate for the U.S. that explains the large 
negative effect. The exception is the computer services industry, where productivity growth in 
the EU has been relatively strong versus a decline in productivity in the U.S.. For the other 
industries in the bottom 5 category, the productivity growth effect is much smaller in an 
absolute sense than for the top 5. In the case of social and personal services, productivity 
growth actually still favors the United States, but offsetting effects mainly come from changes 
in employment structure. Changes in employment shares have almost all contributed to 
offsetting the U.S.-EU productivity growth differential, although for different reasons. In the 
                                                 
54 The changes in employment share in retailing declined at a faster rate in the U.S. than it increased in 
the EU, making the average effect negative.   72 
case of health, and social and personal services, the employment share grew faster in the EU 
than in the U.S. while in both food products and government, the employment share shrunk 
less rapidly in the EU than in the United States. The exception to this pattern comes from 
computer services, where employment in the U.S. expanded at a faster rate than in the EU.   73 
Table E4, The top and bottom 5 industry contributions to the U.S.-EU productivity growth gap and the importance of the four effects, 
1995-2000 
Top 5 Industry Total Productivity growth Employment shares Productivity levels Change in shares
1 Semiconductors 0.361 0.132 0.212 -0.001 0.018
2 Securities 0.355 0.235 0.078 0.018 0.024
3 Retail trade 0.317 0.282 0.054 0.000 -0.019
4 Wholesale trade 0.233 0.257 0.016 0.000 -0.040
5 Construction 0.157 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.159
Bottom 5 Industry Total Productivity growth Employment shares Productivity levels Change in shares
1 Food products -0.067 -0.092 0.029 -0.003 -0.001
2 Health -0.064 -0.041 0.000 0.000 -0.023
3 Government -0.061 -0.073 0.037 0.000 -0.024
4 Social/personal services -0.061 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.054
5 Computer services -0.052 -0.087 -0.004 -0.010 0.050    75 
Appendix Table E5: The difference in contribution to total productivity growth for 1995-2000 
   for U.S.-EU decomposed into four effects
Total Productivity EmploymentProductivity Emp. share
growth share level change
Total Economy 1.087 0.688 0.350 -0.074 -0.025
Total ICT-producing manufacturing 0.478 0.108 0.273 -0.005 0.011
30 Office and Comp. Eq. 0.104 0.049 0.051 -0.007 -0.009
313 Fiber optics 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005
321 Semiconductors 0.361 0.075 0.206 0.001 0.016
322 Communication eq. -0.002 -0.017 0.000 0.002 0.009
323 Radio and TV eq. 0.013 0.000 0.018 -0.001 0.004
331 Instruments -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
Total ICT-producing services -0.092 -0.109 0.012 -0.008 0.107
64 Telecommunications -0.040 -0.087 0.011 -0.001 0.052
72 Computer services -0.052 -0.022 0.001 -0.006 0.055
Total ICT-using manufacturing -0.092 -0.050 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011
18 Apparel -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.005
22 Printing & Publishing -0.031 -0.033 -0.001 0.003 -0.002
29 Machinery -0.021 -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 0.002
31-31.3 Electrical machinery -0.020 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.004
33-33.1 Watches & instruments -0.007 0.018 -0.006 -0.005 -0.015
35.1 Ships -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004
35.3 Aircraft -0.011 -0.026 0.010 0.003 -0.001
35.2+35.9 Railroad and other 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004
36-37 Misc. manufacturing 0.007 0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.005
Total ICT-using services 0.893 0.765 0.148 0.022 -0.106
51 Wholesale trade 0.233 0.261 0.016 -0.002 -0.038
52 Retail trade 0.317 0.280 0.055 0.000 -0.020
65 Banks 0.035 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.039
66 Insurance -0.020 -0.012 -0.003 0.001 -0.007
67 Securities trade 0.355 0.239 0.079 0.018 0.024
71 Renting of machinery 0.013 0.015 0.004 -0.013 -0.004
73 R&D 0.011 0.010 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
74.1-74.3 Professional services -0.049 -0.027 -0.001 0.019 -0.096
Total Non-ICT manufacturing -0.088 -0.010 -0.049 -0.026 -0.004
15-16 Food products -0.067 -0.094 0.030 -0.004 0.000
17 Textiles -0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.011
19 Leather 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.005
20 Wood products -0.008 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 0.003
21 Paper products -0.016 -0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.009
23 Petroleum & coke 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.000 -0.003
24 Chemicals -0.006 0.028 -0.039 -0.018 0.023
25 Rubber and plastics 0.004 0.016 -0.005 0.000 -0.006
26 Stone, clay & glass 0.007 0.009 -0.010 -0.001 0.009
27 Basic metals 0.019 0.015 -0.003 -0.002 0.009
28 Fabricated metal products -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.003
34 Motor vehicles -0.023 0.015 -0.011 0.001 -0.027
Total Non-ICT services -0.144 0.029 0.047 -0.053 -0.266
50 Repairs -0.050 -0.057 0.007 -0.001 -0.006
55 Hotels & restaurants -0.012 0.047 -0.008 -0.011 -0.043
60-63 Transportation -0.019 -0.010 -0.016 -0.006 0.013
70 Real estate 0.089 0.232 0.007 -0.004 -0.144
74.9 Other business services 0.021 0.028 0.002 -0.030 0.004
75 Government -0.061 -0.074 0.037 0.001 -0.026
80 Education 0.013 -0.020 0.014 0.001 0.018
85 Health -0.064 -0.041 0.000 0.003 -0.027
90-93 Personal & social services -0.061 -0.075 0.003 -0.006 -0.055
Total Non-ICT other industries 0.133 -0.045 -0.069 0.005 0.243
01-05 Agriculture 0.048 0.055 -0.057 -0.008 0.059
10-14 Mining -0.031 -0.049 0.005 0.007 0.005
40-41 Utilities -0.041 -0.049 -0.014 -0.004 0.026
45 Construction 0.157 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.154     76 
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